Can welfare states promote gender equality? Gender analysts of welfare states investigate this question and the broader set of issues around the mutually constitutive relationship between systems of social provision and regulation and gender. The comparative study of gender and welfare states has, since about 1990, been favored by the occurrence of two intellectual “big bangs” -- gender studies and regime analysis. It has been powered by the engagement of the two constituencies created by these explosions of innovation and the partial integration of their respective insights in scholarship on gender, politics and policy.1 First, many feminist scholars served as ambassadors of gender studies, which encompassed a series of dazzling intellectual developments that moved across disciplines and challenged the masculinist assumptions that reigned in the academy as elsewhere. They reclaimed the term “gender” from dusty linguistic usage, and deployed it, as Donna Haraway (1991, p.131) explained, "...to contest the naturalization of sexual difference in multiple arenas of struggle. Feminist theory and practice around gender seek to explain and change ...systems of sexual difference whereby 'men' and 'women' are socially constituted and positioned in relations of hierarchy." Gender is not an attribute of individuals but a social relationship, historically varying, and encompassing elements of labor, power, emotion and language; it crosses individual subjectivities, institutions, culture and language (see, e.g., Scott 1988; Connell 1987, 1995, 2002).2 Path-breaking work in the 1970s and 1980s established that gender is (in part) constituted by systems of social provision and regulation, and in turn, shapes them (see, e.g., Finch and Groves 1983; Hernes 1987; Land 1978; Lewis 1993; Pearce 1978; Pateman 1988; Ruggie 1984;
Sassoon 1987; Waerness 1984; for reviews, see O’Connor 1996; Orloff 1996; Gordon 1990).

To achieve recognition that “gender matters,” feminists have had to engage in a multi-faceted critique, including not only analytic concepts and theories specific to the study of social policy but also the social theories, methodologies, and epistemological presumptions underpinning this and other areas of political study (see, e.g., Butler and Scott 1992; Harding 2004; Orloff 2005). Indeed, so fundamental has been the feminist challenge, gender studies can arguably be said to represent a paradigmatic change of the Kuhnian variety. Feminist scholars have moved to bring the contingent practice of politics back into grounded fields of action and social change and away from the reification and abstractions that had come to dominate models of politics focused on “big” structures and systems (Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2005). Rather than developing a new totalizing theory, they seek to understand men’s and women’s diverse gendered dispositions, capacities, resources, goals and modes of problem solving, deployed in gendered political action. Conceptual innovations and reconceptualizations of foundational terms have been especially prominent in the comparative scholarship on welfare states, starting with gender, and including care, autonomy, citizenship, (in)dependence, political agency, and equality. It is impossible to see – much less to describe and understand -- the mutually constitutive relation between gender and welfare states without these conceptual and theoretical innovations.

Second, studies of systems of social provision and regulation moved from essentially linear analytic modes – where welfare states more or less generous, for example – to configurational analyses of “regime types” or “worlds of welfare capitalism” in which variation was conceptualized as qualitative and multi-dimensional, resulting in clusters of countries with similar characteristics (Esping-Andersen and Hicks 2005; Amenta 2005; Orloff 2005). Or at least that is one way to understand Esping-Andersen’s development of the insights of Titmuss, Korpi and others, alongside his own compelling – if not exactly Kuhnian paradigm-shifting -- insights into the character of comparative variation, which appeared in the influential 1990 Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990). Taking a basically Marshallian understanding of “politics versus markets,” Esping-Andersen also promoted the concept of “decommodification” (which he had initially developed with Walter Korpi [1987]) to capture the potentially emancipatory political effects of welfare states for working classes.

Falsely universalizing (implicitly masculinist) analytic frames undergirded almost all comparative studies of welfare states, including Esping-Andersen’s. This had been true for some time, and feminists, from the 1970s on, continually pointed out how, occluding the gendered underpinnings of systems of social provision and the specific situations of women. Yet something about Esping-Andersen’s analysis brought about greater engagement between feminist and mainstream scholars of welfare states.3 Perhaps it

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3 This may be yet another chapter in the vexed relationship between feminism and Marxism, an earlier version of which was astutely analogized to an “unhappy marriage” by feminist economist Heidi Hartmann (1981). It is also possible – but has not yet been
was his analyses of how changing “labor-market regimes” and shifts from industries to services affected women and gender, or his revitalization of an emancipatory yet still gender-blind concept of social citizenship rights. He noticed women's employment behaviors, how state policies in the provision of services mediated the impact of shifts from industrialism toward service-dominated economies, and considered how gendered employment patterns might shape political conflicts. This took him squarely onto the intellectual terrain that had been tilled by feminists without acknowledging that work. This circumstance simultaneously provoked women scholars and stimulated their creative reappropriations of the regime concept, expansions of notions of social citizenship rights and investigations of care services and shifting post-industrial employment patterns, leading to a revisioning of welfare states as core institutions of the gender order (see, e.g., Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993; O’Connor, Orloff, and Shaver 1999).

In contrast to other subfields of political science and sociology, gendered insights have to some extent been incorporated into mainstream comparative scholarship on welfare states (see, e.g., Korpi 2000; Huber and Stephens 2000; Esping-Andersen’s 1999, Esping-Andersen et al 2002). Historical institutionalism and other modes of historical social science, approaches sharing constructionist proclivities with feminist analysis, are prominent in comparative studies of welfare states (see, e.g., reviews by Esping-Andersen and Hicks 2005; Amenta 2005; Orloff 2005; Steinmetz 2005; Adams, Clemens and Orloff 2005; Calhoun 1995). Both promote analyses that are time and place specific rather than seeking general laws, both take a denaturalizing and contingent view of political identities and goals, and both share at least some attachment to egalitarian, or even emancipatory, politics.4 The arguments between examined empirically – that the essentially social-democratic orientations of many scholars of welfare states, and the states in which they worked or idealized, was potentially “friendly” to women (see, e.g., Hernes 1987), and feminist analysis. And perhaps Esping-Andersen absorbed quite a lot of feminism indirectly through engagement in political contexts within which feminism was politically significant (Denmark, Sweden and the University of Wisconsin-Madison), although, alas, this absorption did not include the awareness that feminists should be seen as well as heard – that is, cited.

4 When mainstream scholars have taken up questions of gender, they have often tried to fit analyses into standard models of causation, that is, in terms of independent and dependent variables; various elements that have shaped welfare states are “inputs,” while the diverse aspects of welfare states’ effects are classed “outputs.” If we begin from the perspective of any historicized orientation, this framework is unlikely to work, including with reference to “gender.” Broadly understood, gender has simultaneously been cause and effect. We can identify explanatory pathways where various aspects of gender, at “time one,” will affect welfare provision in some way, which will include gendered components, at a later time; recursivity is inevitable. Of course, not all approaches to gender are historicized, but I prefer an approach that relinquishes the concept of a system or structure for a more contingent understanding of power and politics. The old models of both feminist and mainstream work were too “model-like.” In
feminists and mainstream scholars over the course of the last two decades have been productive, powering the development of key themes and concepts pioneered by gender scholars, including defamilialization,5 the significance of unpaid care work in families and the difficulties of work-family “reconciliation,” gendered welfare state institutions, the relation between fertility and women’s employment, and the partisan correlates of different family and gender policy models. Yet there has rarely been full “gender mainstreaming,” for the mainstream still resists the deeper implications of feminist work, and has difficulties assimilating concepts of interdependency, care, and gendered power.

Feminists begin their critical project with the very definition of the “welfare state.” Most analysts use the term loosely to mean modern systems of social provision and regulation that cover (almost) all of the population, and operationalize it with a standard array of social insurance and social assistance programs. Masculinist paradigms centered on pensions and social insurance, following their conception of politics as shaped by economic developmental or class interests. Gender analysts, having given up assumptions about class conflict as the “motor of history,” have a more pluralistic notion of which social policy institutions are “core.” They point to the significance for gender and women’s welfare of state activities such as family and employment law, the reproduction of nations and “races” (Williams 1995), housing, and the regulation of those who receive benefits.6

The geographic and socio-political limits of “welfare states” are also contested. Until the last decade or so, the great bulk of research, including feminist work, on systems of social provision and regulation focused on countries with identifiable “welfare states,” which had been industrialized, rich and democratic since the Second World War. These

that sense, even when they considered gender, they also made it invisible for they had no way to account for what is at once its contingency and tenacity.

5 “Defamilization” was used by Esping-Andersen in his later work (1999; Esping-Andersen et al 2002) to parallel “decommodification.” He used the term to indicate the extent to which citizens (and others) could get care services outside of familial ties; his conceptual debt to Lister (1994) and Saraceno (1997) went mostly unacknowledged, and, perhaps not surprisingly, the radical edge of their concept, linking it to relations of dominance and dependency in families, was blunted in his usage. Lister (1994) coined the term de-familialization; she defines it as “…the degree to which individuals can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independently of family relationships, either through paid work or social security provision” (Lister 1994, p.37), a usage closer to Orloff’s (1993) “capacity to form an autonomous household” than to the notion of the availability of care outside the family.

6 Feminists have also been at the vanguard of attempts to bring the regulatory aspects of social provision to the fore; building on the contributions of Foucauldian analysis, for example, they have examined the ways in which the very categories of welfare provision are productive of political identities, as well as to explore the links between systems of punishment and of welfare (see, e.g., Haney 2004, forthcoming; G. Lewis 2000).
characteristics define the scope conditions and theoretical assumptions of most analysis; “welfare states” arise out of processes of capitalist economic development and democratization. As various European countries democratized, first with the fall of the dictatorships in the Iberian peninsula and then with the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, these countries also joined the universe of comparative welfare state cases (particularly those funded by the European Union, for which academic integration can usefully further the political project of integration). As democratization and development have proceeded in other parts of the world – East Asia and Latin America, one finds emerging or expanding systems of social provision, too, although there is less systematic comparison across these groupings and the core, and little gender analysis (e.g., Haggard and Kaufman 2008). There are not systems that can actually claim to be welfare states in most of the global South, but an engaging literature about gender and development has emerged (e.g., Razavi, Pearson). As yet, there has not been much intellectual traffic across the boundaries that separate “welfare states” in the global North from systems of social provision and regulation elsewhere. Studies of world systems, imperialism, and colonialism also raise hard questions about the extent to which the welfare states of the global North are founded on the selective exclusion of labor from the south and the exploitation of these regions’ resources. For reasons of space, I here concentrate on the comparative literature on the rich democracies, in which the relations among gender, policy and politics have been most extensively examined.

Conceptualizing Gender for Welfare State Analysis

“Gender” represents the key theoretical and conceptual innovation of feminist scholarship, including that focused on systems of social provision and regulation. Because “domesticating” intellectual and political trends continually threaten to undermine the central insights of gender analysis, I want to highlight precisely what make it so potentially unsettling for analyses of politics, including the politics of welfare provision, by contrasting it with mainstream understandings.

Mainstream analysts of social policy increasingly attend to certain aspects of gender relations, spurred by earlier waves of feminist scholarship and by obvious gendered changes across workplaces, families, and politics. Most focus on women’s individual “differences” from men, in preferences, lifetime labor patterns and associated social rights (e.g., Esping-Andersen et al 2002, ch.3; Gilbert 2008; Hakim 1995, 2000). Hakim, under the rubric of “preference theory,” marshals empirical evidence for the heterogenous “lifestyle preferences” of women, arguing that they can be grouped by their orientation to work and family as home-centered, adaptive, or work-centered. Home-centered and career-centered women pursue their preferences whatever the policy context, but social policies have some impact on the large majority who are “adaptive” women. This perspective has been influential in European policy discussions of work/family “reconciliation,” as policymakers seek to activate the “adaptive” group,
presumably without the need to question the gendered division of labor that this idea of preferences tends to take for granted.⁷

Claims for the power of preference – by Hakim, Esping-Andersen or mainstream economists – have been questioned on at least three fronts. First, these approaches conceptualize gender as an individual attribute and ignore the relational character of gender. Second, there is considerable evidence, to be detailed below, that gendered hierarchies and inequalities, which shape men’s and women’s preferences, practices and opportunities, survive. But perhaps the most important question – where do these preferences come from? -- is not even asked. Feminists have contributed to a rich literature, in which agency -- including preferences, desires and identities -- and structure are mutually constitutive, a notion better captured by notions of “structuration” and historical process than by fixed outcomes (see, e.g., Rubin 1975; Sewell 1992; Biernacki 2005).⁸ On this view, knowledge, subjectivity and political agency are both constrained and enabled by existing gendered categories (Butler 1990; Clemens 2005; Zerilli 2005). Gendered identities and agency – including orientations to family and employment – are not pre-political, or “natural.” Rather, welfare provision, alongside other political and social institutions, is involved in shaping gendered divisions of labor and the preferences, needs, and desires that sustain it (see, e.g., Fraser 1989; Lewis 1997; Morgan 2006; Haney 2002, forthcoming).

Feminists have, through their creative appropriations of diverse social and political thinking, produced theories that contest sexual hierarchies – and it is worth underlining that this marks the key difference between feminist and noncritical approaches to gender.⁹ For feminists, gender is not only about the “differences” that concern

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⁷ Hakim and others (e.g., Gilbert 2008) oppose their analyses to feminism, which they see as assuming that women would be like men if they only could – for example, if universal child care were available. Yet a good deal of feminist work rejects masculine models of the life course (e.g., Fraser 1994; Gornick and Meyers 2003) and insists that women’s normative preferences, “gendered moral rationalities,” or commitments to ethics of care indeed shape their choices about how to balance caring and employment (see, e.g., Crompton and Lyonette forthcoming; Duncan and Edwards 1997; Williams 2000).

⁸ Gayle Rubin (1975) is an inspirational figure for many feminists interested in links among families, sexualities, economics and politics. In a brilliant and foundational intervention, Rubin drew on Marx, Freud and Levi-Strauss to link “structure” and “agency” – the division of labor to the “exchange of women” that sustains family and kinship helped to create heterosexual and gendered subjectivities that in turn desired and needed gendered patterns of activities and heterosexual exchange.

⁹ Feminist theory draws on multiple sources to understand and revision gender – Marx, Freud, Arendt, Foucault, Bourdieu, liberalism, existential philosophy, structuralist anthropology, poststructuralism, to name only a few of its influences. It’s a kaleidoscopic array, with cross-fertilizing, hybridizing tendencies galore, which, for reasons of space and thematic focus, I cannot explore here. But I do want to note that this profusion of theoretical resources may well have been necessary to understand a
“preference” theory but also their construction and maintenance through systems of power, one of which is the welfare state itself. This does not always mean masculine domination (a la Bourdieu [2001]), but includes possible local reversals (Connell 1987), “undoings” of gender (Butler 2004), or radical inaugurations of new political forms (Zerilli 2005). Control of states is a key stake in gendered power struggles given states’ monopoly over the collective means of coercion, and their constitution and regulation of the (gendered) categories of political participation and citizenship rights (Connell 1987, 1995, 2002; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; Ferree 2009).10

Early feminist interventions around social provision started from premises about the uniformity and fixity of the category of women. The key difference was between women and men, with policies reinforcing that binary division and politics reflecting women’s and mens’ distinctive and competing interests. Both premises have been extensively critiqued (see, e.g., Zerilli 2005; Butler 1990; Hancock 2007; McCall 2001). Social policies and politics are now investigated in terms of “multiple differences” among women (and men), based on other dimensions of power, difference and inequality like “race,” class, ethnicity, sexuality, religion.11 Moreover, the position of men is

“topic” that ranges from states to identities (i.e., macro- to microscopic levels), as well as to gain leverage from one school of theory against another in the wrestling of gendered insights from otherwise unpromisingly masculinist legacies. Moreover, feminist analyses are not uniform in how they challenge masculine dominance. Sometimes this has accompanied a valorization of women’s allegedly natural “difference,” but in the era since World War II, the predominant tendency is to view gender through the lens of social construction and, among large swaths of gender analysis, to stress the potentialities of women entering formerly masculine domains and taking up practices and freedoms formerly limited to men. Yet “difference feminism,” valorizing women’s differences from men even while not viewing them as natural, continues to thrive – indeed Hakim’s perspective shares many features with this orientation.

10 States are implicated in intimate violence as well, not because they directly “franchise” men to employ such means within the family, but because by defining some matters as “private” and properly outside the states’ regulatory and police powers, men have been left free to act as they saw fit – and too many acted violently. Women reformers since the early 20th century have attempted to define such violence as a public concern (Gordon 1988; Brush 2002; see Weldon [2002] for a cross-national survey of policies to combat domestic violence).

11 Claims that any given policy benefits (all) “women” are now suspect, as not all women benefit equally or at all from programs targeted at specific kinds of women (e.g., married women, employed women). Working-class mobilizations had indeed demanded – supposedly as the price of political effectiveness -- the subordination of gendered and “racial” identities and issues, but so, too, did some mobilizations based on “women” demand subordination of issues related to sexuality, “race,” or class. But for others, the problem with the category of women comes from assumptions of fixity, and the cure is more historicized notions of the emergence of political identities and groups, so that categories are seen as (at least potentially) unstable, allowing for transformations
increasingly problematized. The notion of the fixity of gender categories has been replaced by more fluid conceptions of gender, reflected in the phrases “doing” or performing gender (rather than “being” a gender), a transformation from gender to gendering (West and Zimmerman 1987; Butler 1990, 2004). This allows for an investigation of the processes of gendering, regendering or degendering in which welfare states are central influences.

Gender and Welfare States: Evidence for Mutual Influence

In this section, I will focus on two clusters of empirical research which illustrate the mutual influence of gender relations and systems of social provision and regulation, and which have been the foci of a considerable amount of feminist research. First, I review work on welfare states and the gendered division of labor, employment, and caring labor (paid and unpaid). Second, I assess the politics of gendered welfare states, including regimes, partisanship, political agency, and citizenship.

intentional and not. Thus, claims can be made for “women” (or “men,” for that matter), but given the inevitable character of politics, they are always contestable (Zerilli 2005) -- claims always include “hailings” related to specific identities, which may or may not resonate with potential political actors (or result in “interpellation, to continue the Althusserian terminology, via Adams and Padamsee [2001]). This would be one way to read the welfare rights movement of the US in the 1960s and 1970s, in which women of color contested their exclusion from social assistance programs for single mothers, on the basis that their mothering, too, was of significance and deserved support (see, e.g., West 1981).

Historically, the gendered division of labor meant men and women performed different kinds of work within productive households; as production moved outside the home to factory and office, women’s work often remained within the home while men sought wages outside it. Scholars describe a “family wage” or housewife-supporting system (see, e.g., Humphries 1979; Bergmann 1986); men depended on women’s care work (for their children and other kin as well) as women (even if they also worked for pay) depended economically on men’s wages, expected to cover the costs of dependent wife, children and maybe other kin. Residual welfare programs might help to sustain, ungenerously, women without access to men’s wages, while core welfare state programs insured breadwinners against the risks of income interruption so that they could continue to provide for their families economically even if unemployed, disabled or retired (see, e.g., Bryson 1992; Nelson 1990). Many identified a mapping of gendered division of labor onto parts of the welfare state: “men’s and women’s welfare states” (e.g., Bryson 1992), “dual channel” or “two tier” welfare states. The feminized “stream” was understood to address predominantly women’s risks -- of family or marital dissolution, with claims based on family statuses, while the “male stream” addressed men’s risks of income interruption associated with employment (Nelson 1990); the inequalities associated with the gendered division of labor were seen to be reflected in the differential generosity and extent of regulatory oversight of clients of the two channels. Reality was a good deal more complex. Not all welfare systems had such a
Gendered labor, care and welfare states

Care is central to many feminist understandings of gender and welfare (see, e.g., Daly and Lewis 2000; Lewis 1992; Finch and Groves 1983; Folbre 2008; Brenner and Laslett 1989; Land 1978; Waerness 1984; Glenn 1992).\(^{13}\) Mainstream researchers address care principally as a question of women’s differences from men (understood as the norm), and as a barrier to employment. In contrast, gender analysts consider care as a socially necessary activity, but due in part to its gendered character, it is not always recognized as such. Care is predominantly women’s work, not a “naturally” feminine emanation of familial love, and is usually linked with other forms of domestic labor (England and Folbre 2000; England 2005; Himmelweit 1995, 2005).\(^{14}\) Doing care is the source of many of women’s economic and political disadvantages in a wage economy and it underlines the centrality of “private” matters for women’s disadvantages in political and economic life, but also offers as well distinctive gendered identifications, resources and ethical commitments. Moreover, care is a relationship characterized by interdependence and connection, power and conflict (Daly and Lewis 2000, p.283; Finch and Groves 1983; Tronto 1993; Kittay 1999). Understanding the social organization of care forces one to think across the assumed divides between economy and family, public and private, paid and unpaid work, emotion and commodity, culture and state social policy, the direct state provision of services and indirect public support for caring in households to take care of their members (Jenson 1997; Daly and Lewis 2000; England 2005).

dualized structure, nor were men and women so neatly divided between the tiers – for example, many women drew benefits based on paid work, or accessed “top tier” benefits based on their status as wives of employed men, differential treatment of women based on marital status was related to racial and ethnic differences, and men of color had less access to the “top” tier than white men (see, e.g., Orloff 1991, 2003; Mink 1998). In any event, this system has been unraveling for many decades now, and increasing wage work among women has transformed families, workplaces and polities (see, e.g., Thistle 2006), and as increasing numbers of women moved into employment, they became entitled to “top-tier” social insurance benefits, although not identically with men’s entitlements (see, e.g., Meyer 1996).

\(^{13}\) “Care” as a term emerged in Britain and Scandinavia, but it is increasingly taken up in other national contexts, and the referent of women’s work caring for family members and other domestic work, usually unpaid, usually in the home – as the feminine side of the gender division of labor -- has certainly been critical to feminist diagnoses of women’s inequality for decades, if not centuries.

\(^{14}\) Feminist economists and sociologists have disagreed about whether care, especially when unpaid, familial and embedded in relationships, is work like any other -- with gendered ideology mystifying that fact -- or is in fact a distinctive kind of human activity that can only be undermined by analogizing it to employment (see, e.g., Himmelweit 1995, 1999, 2005, 2007; England and Folbre 1999; England 2005).
Gender analysts of welfare states have stressed the linkages among specific gendered divisions of labor, models of family life, and social policy. For much of the post-WW2 era, the dominant model supported by policy has been the nuclear family with breadwinning man and his wife, who performed the domestic and care labor, even if she was also employed. This arrangement is often called “traditional” although its full realization – particularly with widespread housewifery even among the working classes – was limited to the period between World War II and the early 1970s (Goldin 1990; Thistle 2006). This period is referred to by many scholars of comparative social policy as the “Golden Age” of welfare states, perhaps reflecting also a certain nostalgia for this gendered arrangement.) Welfare states also sustained men’s advantaged position in labor markets, and did not ameliorate fully the economic and other vulnerabilities that attached to women’s caregiving. We are now witnessing an ongoing “farewell to maternalism” (Orloff 2006) and shift to policies that support the “adult worker family,” with both men and women expected to be in paid employment (Lewis 2001). The increasing labor force participation of women and decline of the breadwinner household has transformed the organization of care across households, markets and welfare states. Non-familial care services, both marketized and public, have developed, but women still do a disproportionate amount of unpaid care and domestic labor. This leaves the heart of the gendered division of labor undisturbed, particularly among heterosexual couples. Taking time to care imposes significant costs on caregivers unless social policy reduces them. “Crises of care” have emerged, as rising demands for care outstrip the supply of familial caregivers; the twin problems of care – for caregivers and for those who are cared for – present demands for social policy makers (Knijn and Kremer 1997). Allowing for (paid) workers to have time to care is one challenge, while finding new supplies of care workers is another, to which some states have responded by encouraging immigration.

Women have entered employment for many reasons, and governments, particularly within the EU, are more interested in women’s activation, partly to offset problems associated with an aging labor force and declining fertility among non-immigrant populations (the “racial” underpinnings of which can only be here noted). Across the developed world, mothers’ participation rates are lower than fathers’, unless there are state or market-provided care services and/or other means of “reconciling” employment and family work. Even when mothers’ participation rates equal fathers’, as in Norden, employment patterns differ, with women taking more parental leaves and working

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15 A number of analysts have stressed that working-class and minority families were less able than middle-class households to access the ideal, but economic historians and historical sociologists show that even among these groups, the majority of married mothers were outside the formal labor market, though they might well participate in various kinds of household provisioning (see, e.g., Goldin 1990, 2006; Thistle 2006).

16 See Alstott (2004) for an interesting proposal to deal with these costs through the establishment of “caregiver resource accounts.”

17 For a long time, women’s employment was negatively associated with fertility levels; this relationship has now become neutral or actually reversed (see, e.g., Phillip Morgan; Esping-Andersen et al 2002; Del Boca and Wetzels 2007).
reduced hours (Leira 1992, 2002). Women in many countries use part-time work or other means of reducing the intensity of standard employment as means for reconciling paid work with family responsibilities (Mutari and Figart 2001; Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1999). Social and employment policies affect gendered employment patterns, as women are drawn into the labor force by differing combinations of service-sector employment (private or public), flexible labor markets, anti-discrimination laws, and/or part-time work; these explain women’s relatively high employment rates in the Nordic countries, North America, the UK and Australia, relatively lower rates in much of continental Europe and Japan, and increasing levels where policy has shifted, as in the Netherlands (Daly 2000b; Estevez-Abe 2001, 2005; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; Gottfried and O’Reilly 2002; Lewis, Knijn, Martin and Ostner 2008).

The availability of public child care services is significant for mothers’ employment, and is related to gendered divides between public and private and to gendered ideologies about mothering and its potential compatibility with paid employment, which may differ across groups of women (Hobson 1994; Lewis 1997; Roberts 1995; Duncan and Edwards 1997; Reese 2005). The Nordic countries have defined the provision of care as a public activity, linked to childrens’ well-being and gender equality, both understood to imply mothers’ employment. In contrast, until very recently, the care of children has been understood to be the province of the family in the UK, most of the continental European countries and Japan, while in North America, care is considered best left to private “choice,” reflecting politically-dominant liberalism (O’Connor et al 1999; Michel and Mahon 2002). In the US, state provision has been all but ruled out (Michel 1999), yet mothers have been able to find private care services, albeit of uneven quality (Orloff 2006; Morgan 2005). Elder care has also been examined vis-a-vis the private/public rubric, but patterns differ somewhat from child care; the Nordics are consistent in offering public services for both, the US for neither, while other countries have a varying mix (see, e.g., Antonnen and Sipila 1996). Care services and policies, in Europe especially, have been changing rapidly in the 2000s, with the expansion of elder and child care services, payments for informal care, and paid leaves (Mahon 2002; Lewis 2006; Ungerson 2004). These shifts reveal the construction and transformation of public-private divides as a critical moment in the gendering of welfare, fixing (temporarily) which needs may be addressed through public social policy, and which are to be left to the family, charity or the market (Lewis 1992; Gal and Kligman 2000; O’Connor et al 1999).

Women more than men shape their employment behavior around the requisites of caregiving (and, to a lesser extent, domestic work). However, taking time out of the labor force to do unpaid care and cleaning work in families – even when it does not add up to full-time and lifelong housewifery -- imposes costs on caregivers, notably lifelong lower incomes and pension entitlements, economic dependency and vulnerability to

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18 There is a lively debate among feminist scholars about the effects of leaves of different lengths on women’s labor force attachment; shorter leaves seem to promote women’s labor force attachment while longer ones decrease it (Gornick and Meyers 2008; Bergmann 2008; Galtry and Callister 2005; Hook 2006).
poverty (England 2005; Hobson 1990; Alstott 2004; Meyer 1996; Joshi et al 1999; Rose and Hartmann 2004). Employment reduces women’s vulnerability and dependency but does not eliminate it: mothers suffer a “motherhood wage penalty” and a “long-term gender earnings gap” in most countries (Misra, Budig, and Moller 2007; Waldfogel 1997; Davies, Joshi, and Peronaci 2000). Some of these economic disadvantages occur due to women’s time spent out of the labor force or working part-time, but there is still a residual [wage] penalty for being a mother due to effects of motherhood on productivity and discrimination by employers against mothers in hiring and promotion (England 2005; Correll and Benard 2004). Moreover, paid care work – disproportionately done by women, is worse paid, all else equal, than other types of work (England, Budig and Folbre 2002; England 2005). Continental European women report the highest gaps, North American women report intermediate levels and Nordic mothers’ wages are closest to men’s wages, at least partly due to policies supporting mothers’ employment (Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel 2006 – get permission to cite; Misra et al 2007).19

The relatively higher poverty rates of lone mothers (even if employed) and elderly widows in most rich democracies attests to the continuing vulnerability of caregivers if they find themselves without access to men’s incomes (Goldberg and Kremen 1990; Caspar, McLanahan and Garfinkel 1994).20 As Hobson (1990) points out in her ingenious application of Hirschmann’s “exit, voice, loyalty” framework to women’s situation in marriage, the conditions of lone mothers – importantly shaped by citizenship rights -- affect married mothers as well, for they reflect something of what their “exit options” would be; the better the situation for solo mothers, she argues, the more power partnered women have. Solo mothers have served as a “test case” of the extent to which welfare states address women’s economic vulnerabilities (e.g., Lewis 1997); their poverty is alleviated -- to a limited extent -- only by generous welfare programs (e.g., in the Netherlands prior to mid-1990s welfare reforms) or employment supported by care services (e.g., in France), and in best-case scenarios, a combination of these (e.g., in the Nordic countries) (Hobson 1994; Christopher 2002; Kilkey and Bradshaw 1999). Thus, where welfare is not generous and employment support is left to market sources, solo mothers’ relative poverty remains high (as in the English-speaking countries and Germany [Daly 2000b]).

The social organization of care affects also the quality of women’s employment as reflected in women’s access to positions of authority and other traditionally masculine occupations (which are advantaged relative to feminine ones [Charles and Grusky

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19 Detailed analyses of mothers’ wages in Norway suggest that although policies supporting mothers’ employment decrease the motherhood wage gap, women continue to suffer disadvantages in pay “due to sorting on occupations and occupation-establishment units” (in other words, occupational sex segregation), which may be linked to discrimination at the point of hiring, or to women’s choices (Peterson et al 2007).

20 All parents of young children now suffer greater risks of poverty than other population groups (McLanahan et al 1995; Esping-Andersen et al 2002).
Gendered occupational segregation, both horizontal and vertical, occurs across the developed countries, but varies in extent and character. Notably, countries identified as “gender-egalitarian” in terms of lower gender gaps in wages and poverty feature higher-than-average levels of occupational segregation. Mandel and Semyonov (2006) identify a “welfare state paradox,” in which well-developed welfare states increase women’s labor force participation – by offering extensive services and leaves -- but simultaneously may hinder women's access to desirable (masculine) jobs. They argue that employers will rationally discriminate against hiring women for “masculine” jobs, since women are far more likely to take leaves and short hours provisions than are men. Defenders of the Nordic model argue that critics ignore the gender-equalizing effects of drawing most women into the workforce, the relatively good conditions of female-dominated public-sector employment and relatively low gender wage gaps (Evertsson et al 2009; Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund 2009; Korpi 2000; Shalev 2008). They note that horizontal segregation of jobs -- that is, gender differentiation of labor -- seems to be acceptable to democratic publics (Korpi et al 2009; Charles and Grusky 2004); here is an instance of “preferences” shaped by the gendered division of labor and social policies. The Nordic model is defended for its beneficial effects on working-class women, but gendered inequalities do remain: women’s access to elite positions, especially in the private sector, is limited, and occupational segregation is associated with some wage penalty. In contrast, in the US, where wage gaps and solo mothers’ poverty are relatively high, there are few policies geared to employed mothers’ care needs, but sex segregation of occupations has been declining since the 1960s and “gendered authority gaps” are lower than in Scandinavia (Tomaskovic-Devey et al 2006; Wright and Baxter 1995). The relative gender-neutrality of liberal regimes or market economies seems to be favorable to women with high skills who are willing to pursue a masculinized employment pattern (Shalev 2009 forthcoming in Social Politics; McCall and Orloff 2005; Estevez-Abe 2005; Orloff 2006).

Social policies recognize and offer institutionalized support to some models of caregiving and family organization while sanctioning others (Ferree 2009; Lewis 1992), complementing the role of culture in shaping care practices (Kremer 2007; Pfau-Effinger 2004). Given the changing landscape of gender across families, markets and states – including the decline of the male breadwinner and full-time maternal care as ideal and reality, and new demands for care, it is not surprising that significant debate has arisen around which models or ideals of gender, family and care will be promoted by social policy (Knijn and Kremer 1997; Mahon 2002; Lewis 2001). Mothers’ employment is widely accepted, but many of the models in play simply modify the gendered division of labor to accommodate paid work with women’s continuing responsibility for care work, as in “reconciliation” measures – part-time work and/or long maternity leaves -- that produce something like a “one and a half” worker model, as in the Netherlands (see, e.g., Mutari and Figart 2001). The ideal of the caregiving woman is also upheld in models of surrogate mothers’ care (e.g., by nannies) and intergenerational care (Kremer 2007); these have been important across continental Europe (with the partial exception...
of France, where this combines with professional children’s education and care services [Morgan 2006; Fagnani 2006].

Models inspired by gender egalitarianism, such as dual-earner/dual carer, focus on professional care and parental sharing, which allow mothers’ employment but pose a challenge to ideologies of gender difference (Sainsbury 1996; Crompton 1999; Kremer 2007; Gornick and Meyer 2003, 2009). Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Norway have adopted the ideal of parental sharing alongside professional care services, and feature policy initiatives to increase men’s caregiving work, such as parental leaves designed to encourage their participation, at best only partially successful – Denmark alone of the Nordics has reversed the trend toward “daddy leaves” although public services are prominent (Hobson 2002; Ellingsaeter and Leira 2006). Models emphasizing “choice,” often linked to women’s equality projects in contexts dominated by liberalism, might allow for pluralism among heterogenous populations as to which models of care and gender they prefer (Mahon 2002; Orloff 2009). In these cases, the extent of marketization and public subsidization determines whether choices are realizable, and how care quality and gender equality will fare (Orloff 2009).

Some women’s care sector jobs are professionalized, or at least unionized and relatively well-paid, but others are classic “bad jobs,” and “racial” and ethnic dimensions of care work are foregrounded in many studies of paid care (Glenn 1992; Lutz 2008). Moreover, caregivers from developing countries or poorer regions within the developed world migrate to the global North or its better-off regions to work for pay providing care to the households of employed women (and men) – in their homes or in service sector jobs; such migrants delegate their care responsibilities to kin (see, e.g., Lutz 2008; Parrenas 2001, 2005; Yeates 2008). Significant empirical and normative debate concerns the use of immigrant labor for tasks that used to be carried out largely by housewives, focusing on whether such arrangements are inherently exploitative or if paid care work, at least potentially, can be made into “good jobs” (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003; Hondagneu-Sotelo 2007; Meagher 2002; Williams and Gavanas 2008).

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21 In a number of countries, many employed mothers currently rely on grandmothers as carers, raising the possibility of difficult tradeoffs – if public care services are not expanded -- in the future as the activation of women results in many more employed grandmothers. The role of immigrants in providing of informal and unregulated in-home care to the elderly, especially in countries without a public care service infrastructure, has captured the attention of a number of scholars concerned about how demands for eldercare are to be met amidst increasingly global gendered patterns of inequality (see, e.g., Leira, Tobio and Trifiletti 2005).

22 Interestingly, Sweden’s economic development in the 1960s, and the concomitant establishment of what has come to be viewed as a “women-friendly” welfare state, was based on a deliberate political choice to mobilize female labor rather than to rely on guest workers -- mainly non-Europeans -- to staff industry, and the same model then applied to the work of care (Mahon 1997). Of course, this does not mean “racial” considerations were absent, but that they played out in different ways than in other
In most discussions of welfare states and care, men are simply absent (but see Kershaw 2006) – their capacity to take up employment and their lack of serious care responsibilities are assumed. Yet men increasingly do take up care, particularly of disabled spouses, but also of children. Hook (2006) demonstrates that increasing time spent on care and domestic work by men is associated both with increasing levels of women’s paid work and with national policy profiles – long parental leaves take mainly by women depress men’s unpaid work and women’s long-term attachment to the labor force; shorter parental leaves increase men’s participation in unpaid work and foster women’s labor force attachment (see also Gornick and Meyers 2003; Morgan and Zippel 2003; Gershuny 2000). In the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, the share of fathers taking leave has been increasing even as the overall proportion of leave days taken by men remains rather small as compared to women (Ellingsaeter and Leira 2006; Bergqvist 2008). Some men would take up more caregiving if they could, yet employers’ gendered assumptions about their lack of encumbrances or demands for extremely long hours get in the way (see, e.g., Hobson, Duvander, Hallden 2006; Gornick and Meyers 2003). Encouraging men’s care – the parental sharing ideal – is critical for those who argue that future progress toward gender equality will come only by “making men more like what most women are now” – encumbered workers (Fraser 1994; Gornick and Meyer 2003, 2009; Orloff 2009). Many find this an attractive vision, but note the problems presented by nonmarital childbearing and marital instability (not all households have two adults to share work) and by employers’ unwillingness to reshape employment around the needs of “encumbered” workers.

Gendered care and employment arrangements have implications for the quality and quantity of care (Morgan 2005; Himmelweit 2007). The principal care crisis in most of continental Europe stems from a lack of public or market services. Analysts agree that in the Nordic countries the quality of public care services is high and the working conditions of care workers are good; the only critique stems from questions of fiscal sustainability, since costs are also high – yet it is basically a political question as to whether subsidizing care is desirable. In the US, the provision of care is plentiful – but mainly marketized and unregulated, leading to stratification in the quality of care. The choice, then, is a high level of public subsidy to overcome the problems, or tolerating inadequate or poor-quality care services. This is a question of politics.

**Gender, politics and social policies**

Comparative studies of welfare states have taken for granted that “politics matters” since the 1970s. Since 1990, the concept of policy regime has dominated the study of social politics and welfare states, including gendered politics and policies. The policy

European countries, where guest workers or immigrants from former colonies were called upon to fill labor demand. Now part of the EU with its far more open labor markets, Sweden too faces issues to do with “racial” and ethnic diversity among its care workers (see, e.g., Williams and Gavanas 2008).
regime approach offers a way to simplify descriptions of the complicated patterns of variation through focusing on more or less coherent clusters of countries, “gendered welfare regimes,” characterized by the logic of the male breadwinner, models of motherhood or extent to which the personal autonomy of women as well as men is supported (Lewis 1992, 1997a, 2001; Orloff 1993; Leira 1992; Sainsbury 1996, 1999; Bergqvist et al 1999).23 Regime analyses have been important for understanding the topography of variation in welfare states,24 yet the typology-based analyses these have often spawned have probably reached the point of diminishing returns. Deepening knowledge of the relations between politics and gender, we might pursue somewhat different strategies: continue to work with the regime concept, with a focus on the articulation of policies and shorn of typologizing as a principal concern, as O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999) suggest. Regime types can be seen as distinctive political-

23 The regime concept, whatever one thinks of specific analyses using this rubric, has some attractive qualities: it brings together a number of dimensions: class coalitions expressed through enduring partisan alliances, state formation, structure and administrative capacities; and the organization of welfare across the three major arenas of collective life – states, markets, families (four if you like Jane Jenson’s “welfare diamond” better than Esping-Andersen’s triumvirate and want to add “third sector” or voluntary organizations). The advantage of simplification is perhaps now lost with the relentless profusion of typologies – including quite a few focusing on gender. Maybe this profusion can explain the continuing prominence of Esping-Andersen’s version, which has the virtue of everyone understanding exactly what the three clusters are, even if they disagree on what is most significant in their characterization. Because Esping-Andersen was aware of European histories of state formation, it is not surprising that his clusters reflect the major political cleavages in Western countries: the left-right cleavage supplemented by the Christian-secular and confessional splits. Gendered analyses of state formation would not contest the significance of these cleavages even as they have added elements of gender and family relations to the mix (see, e.g., Adams 2005).

24 Jane Lewis (1992) showed that different countries cluster according to different strengths of a male breadwinner model, and these clusters do not map onto Esping-Andersen’s. Leira (1992, 2002), Bergqvist et al (1999), Borchorst and Siim (2002), and Ellingsaeter and Leira (2006), among others, all found significant gendered dimensions of variation, particularly related to “models of motherhood,” among the Nordic countries. France and Belgium, with classically “Bismarckian” systems of social provision, differ considerably from other continental European countries in terms of the supports offered to mothers’ employment (see, e.g., Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1994; Gornick and Meyers 2003; Morgan 2006), although some of their reform processes may bear similarities (Morel 2007); the pronounced “familism” of Southern European countries distinguishes them on the comparative landscape (Saraceno 1997; Gonzalez, Jurado and Naldini 2000). O’Connor et al (1999) found important gendered differences across countries classed as “liberal.” In short, the gendered dimensions of welfare states appear to vary at least partly independently from class-related characteristics, and typologies generated on the basis of gender relations may well differ from those based on other aspects of power, difference and inequality.
institutional opportunity structures, producing historically- and nationally-specific sets of interests, goals, identities, coalitions, administrative capacities and definitions of problems and categories that influence social politics in path-dependent ways -- policy creates politics. By examining the articulation of different policies, more accurate pictures of the effects of systems of social provision emerge. Single logics, or multiple and possibly competing logics are institutionalized in different parts or levels of states. Alternatively, one might disaggregate the regime concept – into driving forces, mediating institutions, and outcomes -- to investigate specific components in a causal analysis (Korpi and Palme 1998).

Korpi (2000) links the predominance of different political parties in the postwar years with different “family policy models” that reflect ideals about care arrangements, family types (dual-earner or “traditional”), and preferred institutions for delivering support -- states, families, or markets. Social-democratic parties, sometimes helped along by affiliated women’s movements, have embraced the model of dual-earner families, and women’s equality via employment (especially public jobs) and public care services (see Adams and Padamsee (2001, p.16) have suggested a systematic reworking of the regimes concept to highlight signification and culture, and encompassing “signs, subjects, strategies, and sanctions”: “A state policy regime, then, can be defined as a set of policies with accompanying sanctions, which are in turn the precipitates of subjects’ actions undertaken on the basis of ordered signs.” They offer illustrations from the literature on maternalism, arguing against various socially-determinist accounts that offer variants of a “standpoint” approach that links political ideologies and goals straightforwardly to social location. They contend that “initially, making the claim that maternalist ideas matter in politics involves showing how the sign of ‘motherhood’ organizes and links together a number of otherwise separate and subordinate signs” (Adams and Padamsee 2001, p.11), then going on to investigate the “hailing” or recruitment of subjects, their strategic policy making, and the sanctions or capacities they may call on to enforce strategies.

For example, O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver (1999), examining social welfare policies, employment regulation and service provision, and abortion rights, find a certain consistency of gendered logics within each of the countries identified as “liberal.” Australia and Britain feature more gender-differentiated policies while Canada and the US come closer to a “gender sameness” approach, even as the essentially liberal character of social policy – upholding the primacy of the market and private provision -- is evident across the four. Gendered dimensions of variation are linked to historic political differences, such as the greater strength of trade unionism in Britain and Australia, and greater feminist activity around civil rights in North America. Ferrarini (2006) notes that as a result of partisan conflicts many countries have gender policies with contradictory tendencies. A long tradition in ethnographic studies has questioned the coherence of politics and policies as enacted at the national level, as for instance in Haney’s (2002) combined ethnographic and comparative historical project on policy transformations in Hungary, like her work investigating the local implementation of US welfare-related programs (Haney 1996); different levels of welfare politics and administration have potentially contradictory exigencies and effects.
also Huber and Stephens 2000; Hobson and Lindblom 1997). Left partisan predominance is consistently associated with high spending welfare states and large state sectors, public services, generous and decommodifying benefits. In countries dominated by social-democratic parties, universal coverage, individual entitlement to benefits and redistributive structures are particularly advantageous for many women (Sainsbury 1996).  

Many welfare-state researchers assume that the left is more favorable to gender equality measures than is the right, but this depends partly on how “equality” is defined. Is it tied to combating poverty and supporting a large public sector, which provides services allowing women more easily to enter employment and jobs for women? This definition sticks with an essentially socialist perspective on “the woman question,” linking women’s emancipation to class struggle. Left-right partisan cleavages do map onto gender politics, but there are more diverse and expansive definitions of gender equality or women’s emancipation, stressing participation and political freedom, equal opportunity and entrepreneurship, or the creation of autonomous women’s spaces (see e.g., Ferree and Martin 2005; Zerilli 2005; Fraser 1994). Feminist social policy researchers, too, have been more willing to grant the advantages of the social-democratic model, perhaps leading to an underappreciation of the pathways by which liberalism is connected to gender equality, as with equal-opportunity legal and regulatory frameworks (Orloff 2006, 2009; O’Connor et al 1999).

28 Korpi, Ferrarini and Englund (2009) develop an historic account of partisan differences that led to differentiation in gender policies from relatively similar starting-points, with low levels of support to either traditional families or to dual earning and caring, in the 1950s (Ferrarini 2006). Walter Korpi notes (personal communication), “Since about 1970, driven by partisan politics as well as by women’s movements, most countries have moved in one of these two directions, generating three relatively clear-cut clusters of countries. With high values on traditional-family support but relatively low values on dual-earner and dual-carer support, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands form a cluster. During the postwar period, these six countries have all had influential Christian-Democratic parties. Distinguished by the clearly highest values on dual-earner support as well as relatively well developed dual-carer support, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden share what can be described as a dual-earner/dual-carer model. After the Second World War, in these countries left parties came to be very influential in terms of vote shares and cabinet participation; they have also had significant women’s movements. (Sprinklings of such support are also found in Canada as well as in Belgium and France.) With low degrees of policy support for either type of family, find eight countries: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, and United Kingdom, and United States. This otherwise heterogeneous group has in common that they abstained from developing claim rights associated with either traditional-family policies and dual-earner policies, leaving it largely to market and kin to reconcile work and child care; non-decisions leading to abstention from change can result from combinations of many different factors.”
Conversely, the dominance of the political right has been associated with policies less encouraging for gender equality. The distinctions between secular and religious right parties, or liberal and conservative regimes, have emerged as quite significant for gender. Religious parties have been the principal exponents of subsidiarity and “traditional” gender ideology in the form of “familism,” which is compatible with state spending, but supports families in forms that reinforce breadwinner/caregiver models and block autonomy-enhancing provision (see, e.g., Saraceno 1997; Korpi 2000). Morgan (2006) argues that the way in which religion was incorporated into modern politics in the 19th century is key to explaining later support for maternal employment policies, potentially significant for feminist politics. In Sweden and France, religious forces were early subordinated to secular ones and played less of a role in shaping family and social policy than in continental Europe; an activist role for the state in welfare and education was accepted. Religious forces, unsubordinated to the state, were stronger in the Netherlands, leading to institutionalized support for welfare provision by the religious pillars, and the US, where private welfare provision prevailed.

Secular right parties are mainly concerned to restrict state spending and public services. In the 1980s, Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were the most prominent proponents of retrenching welfare states. But neo-liberals are not necessarily hostile to women’s employment, and have been uninterested in offering alternatives to commodification; this has been evident in various campaigns over the years to retain the standard of “less eligibility” in social assistance that might otherwise be used by low-skill single mothers and others (see, e.g., Mink 1998, or Reese [2005] on the opposition of business and large agricultural employers to generous welfare in the US). Leaving family support to the market has undercut “traditional” families as women are drawn into employment and men’s prerogatives are unprotected by states, as in the US (Orloff 2006). They do not favor social spending and state services to support women’s employment, but prefer tax breaks for two-earner families. Regulatory measures, such as anti-discrimination legislation, have had more contradictory fates under secular right parties’ dominance, although opposition to regulation is now part of the neoliberal mantra (Prasad 2006).

In the 1990s, innovative analyses of the development of modern social policy revealed the role of women, and, less often, men, as political actors pursuing specifically

\[29\] Social Catholicism of the early twentieth century was compatible with many “maternalist” measures – such as maternity leave -- to “protect” working-class mothers and children, that have, in the contemporary era been utilized by employed women of all classes (see, e.g., Pedersen 1993; Koven and Michel 1990; Saraceno 1991). These measures did not grow out of any concern with gender equality.

\[30\] Even before the political predominance of neo-liberalism, in the early 1970s, US President Nixon, a Republican, vetoed a bill that would have laid the foundations for a broad-based system of child care on the grounds that it was the equivalent of communism (Michel 1999; Morgan 2006).
gendered goals, such as mothers’ pensions31 or child care services, or men’s “honorable” pension provision or family wages (see, e.g., Skocpol 1992; Orloff 1993b; Pedersen 1993; Koven and Michel 1993; Goldberg 2007; Misra and Akins 1998). Social policy concerns far more than questions of class, and varies by much more than relative generosity or extent of decommodification. Instead, gender joins class, nation, “race,” religion and other dimensions of power, difference and inequality to shape politics, in historically contingent and variable ways. For example, we see state officials’ stakes in the production and regulation of nations or “races,” citizens and soldiers (what some call “biopolitics” and which inevitably involves women’s reproductive capacities in some way); mens’ concerns to gain or maintain family-supporting wages; women’s interests in combating the economic dependency and poverty linked to their caregiving.32 Gendered actors may be identified with social movements – women’s equality movements, “maternalists,” or anti-feminist groups, or with political parties and state administrations, such as “femocrats,” women in specialized gender equality units (Eisenstein 1996; Mazur and McBride 2007). With the expansion of supranational organizations, feminist and other groups have made strategic and tactical use of openings – such as the mandate for gender mainstreaming -- at different levels of policy-making to press their demands (see, e.g., Walby 2004; Lewis 2006; Mahon 2002, 2006).

Citizenship has long been understood in exclusively masculine terms, linked to a particular conception of political subjects: as rational, autonomous, unburdened by care, impervious to invasions of bodily integrity.33 If, as gender scholars contend, the

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31 Mothers’ pensions (or widows’ allowances) were to support the full-time caregiving of “worthy” women who had lost their husbands and would have had to turn to degrading poor relief or to give their children up to orphanages so that they could take up wage work had alternative state support been unavailable (Skocpol 1992; Orloff 1991).
32 A feminist conception of politics also highlights the historically-constructed and gendered character of the “public-private” divide, which was brought out as well in the second-wave feminist slogan of “the personal is political” – many issues formerly consigned to the “private sphere,” but of great political consequence for women, such as domestic violence or care work, have been politicized, that is made public issues, in the last decades. Similarly, some issues have been taken out of the states’ paternalistic oversight due in part to feminist agitation (e.g., “women’s right to choose” in terms of reproduction and sexuality).
33 Rational-actor models of behavior might predict that women will eschew caregiving so that they might avoid associated vulnerabilities, and one might interpret declining fertility levels in this light (Himmelweit 2007). Yet most women continue to have babies and to be invested in care, despite these costs -- perhaps displaying an alternative “ethic of care” (Williams 2000). Economists may have a readier answer to these puzzles than the “rats” among political scientists and sociologists, because they are willing simply to accept a rigid divide between private/family and public/market and state, and impute rationality to action in the latter and altruism in the former. Other social scientists insist on the social embeddedness of the economy, the cultural construction of value and the operation of self-interest within the intimate sphere (e.g., Zelizer 1994; Carruthers
need for care is inevitable, given humans’ dependence in infancy and old age, and often in between, we must reassess conceptions of citizens and of political action. Women gained social rights before enfranchised men conceded the suffrage, and rights related to women’s bodily self-determination are still contested. Women have also often differed from men in the kinds of citizenship rights they have demanded from welfare states; while working-class men may indeed aspire to “decommodification” – at least when unemployment is not the preeminent threat, many women have found that the right to formal, paid work may provide new resources and organizational capacities. Men’s citizenship rights have been linked historically to military service and paid employment, and social citizenship rights are often complemented by special benefits – a “military welfare state,” for soldiers and veterans, mostly men (Gifford 2006; Skocpol 1992; Mettler 2005). Women citizens and feminist scholars have tried to expand the notion of social and political participation that undergirds citizenship rights to include mothering and care work, whether or not it is paid (Knijn and Kremer 1997; Lister 2003; Pateman 1988) – this is one way of understanding recent moves to gain pension credits for periods of caregiving (MacDonald 1998). Drawing on the experiences of women’s political action and an understanding of interdependency as the basic human condition, new citizenship rights essential to emancipation have been enunciated by gender scholars: capacities to form autonomous households (Orloff 1993); rights to time to care and to be cared for (Knijn and Kremer 1997), or “body rights” (Shaver 1994).

Women’s presence in politics has revolutionized policy. In the early twentieth century, “maternalists” entered politics on the basis of “difference,” made claims to citizenship based on their capacities to mother, and idealized a maternalist state that could care for its citizens, especially mothers and their children (Skocpol 1992; Koven and Michel 1993; Bock and Thane 1991). Many “maternalist” claims hewed closely to family wage ideologies (which imply women’s economic dependence), while others showed linkages to nationalist projects of promoting the health of specific “races” or nations through attention to maternal and infant health (see, e.g., Bock and Thane 1991; Bellingham and Mathis 1994). The different fates of maternal and infant protection programs across the developed world reflect as well their entanglements with the politics of reproduction, and thus to pro-natalism or anti-natalism (including who has a “right to a family”), and to questions of social closure, citizenship and the regulation of women’s bodies (e.g., through legislation allowing or forbidding access to contraception and abortion). But some women reformers made claims for a “motherhood allowance” to be available to all

2005). This latter perspective is in sympathy with gendered analyses stressing interdependency, calculation and altruism across markets, states and families (Folbre and Hartmann 1988; England 2005; Folbre and Nelson 2000), or noticing the compulsory character of much of what gets labeled “altruism” by women in families (Land and Rose 1985). Rational choice theories or assumptions must fall to the wayside or accept more stringent historical and cultural scope conditions once these understandings are taken on board (Adams 1999).

34 Knijn and Kremer (1997) stress that there must also be a right not to care, which means that people must have rights to public services, recognizing that not everyone can or wants to depend on family members for care.
mothers (not just widows), showing the potential radicality of maternalism, as activists aspired to economic independence and familial autonomy (see, e.g., Lake 1994). (Men also organized in this era for policies that would support their preferred familial role as breadwinner, although this was usually done in the name of their status as workers [see, e.g., Pedersen 1993].)

Today, women’s movements for gender equality press for policies to support women’s employment, particularly anti-discrimination and affirmative action, parental leave and child-care services (O’Connor et al, ch.3; Michel and Mahon 2002), and higher proportions of women “holding key positions in governmental and political organizations” positively influences social spending and adoption of equality policies (O’Regan 2000; Bolzendahl 2009). However, claims based on motherhood have not been abandoned but modified to accommodate women’s wage-earning activities – many interpret the Swedish story as an essentially maternalist one of allowing working-class employed women to be mothers (e.g., Hobson 1993), which has since been expanded. Anti-feminist groups promote ideals of “traditional” gender institutions in marriage, sexuality and reproduction as more congruent with women’s “need” to be protected (see, e.g., Mansbridge 1986; Luker 1984). When women’s groups and voting blocs are divided, as in Italy between socialist/ secular and Catholic orientations, or anti-feminist movements are well-mobilized, the adoption of policies seen as promoting or supporting women’s employment and public care provision, key planks of women’s equality movements’ programs, has been blocked. Yet as full-time housewifery declines, one may question how long anti-feminist traditionalism will last, especially as it runs afoul of neo-liberal mandates for women’s activation or instrumentalist concerns with declining fertility. Even as feminism may have declined as a set of organized movements, many tenets of gender equality have been institutionalized, and new forms of feminist mobilization, linked to the continuing dilemmas of care and domestic work, economic and political participation, and aimed at restructuring systems of social provision and regulation, have emerged.

The transformation of mainstream scholarship by the full integration of gender analysis is necessary to understand the development of welfare states and capitalism as well as gender. Gender has been at the center of transformations of welfare states, families and capitalist economies. Social politics increasingly features issues related to gender: fertility, immigration, labor supply, the supply of care workers and services, taxes and mothers’ employment; gender equality in households, employment and polity. Women’s citizenship, political standing, and capacity to claim social benefits are increasingly based on employment or employment plus parenthood, and this implies that feminist politics is also being transformed, perhaps by bidding “farewell to maternalism” (Orloff 2009). Gendered insights – particularly around power and politics -- radicalize and transform the comparative study of welfare states, and in the process “remake uncritical theory as critical theory” (Calhoun 1995, p.xxiii; Orloff 2005), a necessary component of projects to ensure that systems of social provision promote equality and care – in other words, welfare, broadly understood.
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