Contributing Citizens: charitable fundraising and the origins of the welfare state in Canada, 1920-1960

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Dear all: The following is an abridged version of the introduction to my forthcoming book and a draft of the concluding chapter. Neither have had their final polish. I particularly hope this conference will help me reflect on the international comparison issues that I raise in the introduction. My presentation at the conference will concentrate on the key methodological points about the relations between local and national scales of analysis and the structuralist cultural analysis on which my claims about the homology of modernizing charity and taxation are based.

Introductory chapter:

Of Charity and Taxation: Public and Private Relationships in Welfare History

Now that I know what I know about the history of charitable fundraising, I find it impossible to take seriously the view that the welfare state was to blame for a decline in charitable giving. But I understand why that idea is plausible to us as potential donors. There is an effort and an emotional strain entailed in truly thinking about need, and in deciding how much to give and to whom. If we imagined that adequate state programs existed, we might think ourselves relieved of that effort. As an explanation of how public provision affected giving, however, this overlooks a major phenomenon of 20th century fundraising. A very big part of modern fundraising was to free donors from exactly the work of feeling and choosing that charity supposedly entailed. Well before the welfare state, modern fundraising tried to make efficiency and impersonality the basis for giving. They failed, but only after making modern charity look like the welfare state in waiting.

When Charles Darrow created the board game Monopoly in 1934, the Community Chest (featured as the good luck card) was as well known as the street names on the board. In more than 300 American cities, there was a Community Chest that annually made an appeal for funds on behalf of the cities' charities. In Canada, too, all of the major cities had similar organizations, as did several smaller centres. These organizations (sometimes called "federations" or "united appeals") were a new expression of the rationalizing impulse that, in the nineteenth century, had produced associated charities groups such as the Charities Organization Society. In the 1920s and 1930s, the federations represented what was innovative in charitable fundraising. The first welfare federations in the U.S. had begun just before the First World War; in Canada, they emerged in the war's immediate aftermath. By 1958, the number of welfare federations in Canada had grown to 74 from eight in 1934. The total amount of funds that they raised increased in real dollar terms until a peak in 1969. They had become a normal element of the system of welfare provision in Canada. Although not yet present in Newfoundland, they were increasingly found in rural centres such as Truro, Nova Scotia, and Joliette, Quebec. One veteran social worker recalls that, in the 1960s, the head of the federated appeal was the most important person in any Canadian city's welfare system. The story of federated fundraising is a prime example (I think the defining one) of how charity became modern in 20th century Canada.

The "Chest idea" was that all the charities making public appeals in any given city would unite to make one common appeal each year, and that the amount asked would be the precise amount required to meet the needs of efficiently organized welfare agencies. A single appeal combined with competent spending would efficiently use the publicity dollars and volunteer
energies that were available to charity. Central oversight of services would prevent duplication and unnecessary spending. Businessmen sitting on management boards and the men and women office workers in the various agencies would be saved the work of planning, managing, and recordkeeping for many separate, smaller fundraising campaigns. Door-to-door canvassers, mainly women, would make the circuit once a year, rather than repeatedly. The federated appeal would be able to avoid risky and irritating fundraising methods.

The risky ones were those that depended on sales to generate revenue: teas, dances, and fairs did not always succeed in making much money. In business terms, they were not cost-effective: lots of effort, and yet unreliable, often small returns. The irritating ones included, for example, the presence in store foyers and downtown streets of “taggers”: people soliciting donations for charity, giving out little lapel labels to each donor. Retail merchants thought that having shoppers run a gauntlet of taggers was bad for business. They hoped the annual appeal would eliminate this nuisance. Finally, the annual appeal of a federation of charities was supposed actually to increase charitable giving. A welfare federation, larger than any of its single member agencies, would command greater and better fundraising resources. It would be able to mount a modern sales campaign. Systematic record-keeping, co-ordinated publicity, team organization, and a military-style chain of command would provide fundraisers with data for strategic planning and the means to motivate and support canvassers. Moral suasion, frail on its own, would be empowered by the tools of modern business.

This new method of charitable fundraising, as I will show, helped to make the welfare state possible. Fundraising for private welfare services may have been intended to make tax-funded services unnecessary, but even though federated appeals funded more and more charities over the decades between 1920 and 1960, they ended up helping in several ways to make public provision increasingly attractive. First, the Chests succeeded during the 1920s and 1930s in increasing the number of donors, using a model of citizen obligation that was identical to the one that legitimated the cross-class, progressive income tax. This model of obligation, though widely discussed in North America since the 1890s, was introduced in the tax system in Canada (and the U.S.) only during and World War II. I argue that the ideological work of interwar years’ fundraisers had helped to make the progressive income tax model politically acceptable. And this model of taxation, with its low threshold of exemption and progressivity of liability, became the model of obligation on which the welfare state’s revenues would be based.

Second, the Chest campaigns used various advertising and public relations techniques to redefine charitable giving as a general civic duty rather than a more specific gender, religious, ethnic, or fraternal obligation. In this way, they promoted conceptions of private duties that appeared increasingly similar to public ones. Third, their fundraising methods generated a particular kind of awareness of welfare needs, a kind that, paradoxically, made it logical to meet those needs through tax-funded programs rather than donation-funded ones. This was especially important during the war years and the 1950s, when better economic conditions seemed to make the needs of the poor less pressing. Fourth, these fundraising organizations built a network of social leaders, from business, labour, religious organizations, and professional social work, who, by the 1950s, became an influential policy community with a broad social base. Their influence was substantially derived from their record of fundraising success. As fundraisers, their purpose was to support private charity, but one of their means of protecting private charity’s viability was to advocate for the expansion of particular tax-funded social programs. By the 1950s, the United Appeals had become part of the new welfare regime. The charities they helped to finance were complements and not alternatives to public programs.

The co-existence of increasing charitable giving and a growing welfare state is not something that our present historical knowledge of the development of welfare in Canada prepares us to understand. The headline news of twentieth century welfare history, rightly, has been tax-funded programs. In the decades from 1920 to 1960, while the Community Chest movement was surging ahead, public programs of welfare provision also grew dramatically. Beginning with workmen’s compensation, veterans’ pensions, and mother’s allowances, and proceeding through to old age pensions, unemployment insurance, family allowances, and unemployment assistance, the provision of relief to the needy was radically transformed. In the same period, tax funds also became increasingly the sole or fundamental support for social services such as hospitals, public health nursing, child protection, recreation, and housing for the
elderly. The beginnings of all of these developments together can, in short form, be called “the origins of the welfare state.” And as the diversity of these developments indicates, the welfare state is not a single thing with a common underlying causality. But in the various histories written of its component parts, there has typically been a theme of these new phenomena replacing older, inadequate agencies, usually ones that relied substantially on private funding: in a word, charities. Thus has grown up in historical writing, as well as in journalistic history and popular memory, a commonsense story in which the welfare state (its agencies at first called “public charities”) took over when “private charity” (usually a family welfare bureau that administered both donor and municipal funds) collapsed.9

This story has begun to be re-considered. Inspired or appalled by some governments’ attempts to dismantle programs of social provision, historians both on the right and left have been questioning the apparently inevitable historical movement from private to public welfare. As Colin Jones wryly observed about the savaging of social spending, “western society’s loss has been the historian’s gain.”10 The politics of the 1980s and 1990s opened up for historians new lines of inquiry and interpretation. James Struthers, who, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had written about the origins of unemployment insurance in the 1930s, focussed in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the dynamics that led both to expansion and contraction of social assistance, ending, not at a triumphalist moment in the early 1960s, but at “the limits of affluence” in the early 1970s.11 As social welfare moved from being an object of apparent consensus to a central focus of political controversy, researchers began to analyse what crucial contingencies made the welfare state’s expansion in the twentieth century possible. Economists, philosophers, and sociologists have all made contributions in this area.12 Historians have been particularly interested in revisiting the 1930s, to understand the conditions that made state expansion politically viable.13 One set of conditions that has emerged as significant has to do with the role of private welfare agencies. Were private agencies no more or less able than public ones to respond to the 1930s crisis? Did they lose ground only when government agencies, for ideological reasons, took over? Or were reluctant governments pressed into relief provision (and other forms of social work) only because no system of donations or private insurance could meet the manifest and socially accepted needs? If, metaphorically speaking, private welfare in the 1930s took a dive off a tall building, did it jump or was it pushed?14

Some of the newer studies echo the older common sense on this question. Lizabeth Cohen, for example, shows that, for Chicago’s working class, it was the failure of private charities and mutual aid in the face of structural economic change that destroyed the old ways of dealing with need and made the intercession of the state, with its resources of taxation and borrowing, necessary to finance the response to new and larger-scale kinds of need. …

In other interpretations of the change from private to public provision, the phenomenon was not an inevitable response to the magnitude of need (at least for male workers), but was rather a deliberate enactment in law of ill-advised state-collectivist ideologies. For example, David Beito argues that fraternal societies would have continued to be viable means of providing institutional care for orphaned children and the elderly had not governments provided competing programs such as old age pensions and mothers’ allowances. Faced with this kind of competition, some fraternal orders closed their Homes and most, by the 1940s, had re-organized as social clubs or life insurance businesses. In losing the practical programs of fraternal societies, Beito argues, the United States lost relationships of “voluntary reciprocity and autonomy” and relegated its poorest citizens to the standing of disparaged dependents.15 While he acknowledges that there were a variety of contributing factors in fraternalism’s decline, including structural change in the work force and market competition from commercial insurance, Beito emphasizes the primary causal weight of government intervention in the security business. His is a “crowding out” argument that owes its basic logic to libertarian macroeconomics. In a recent interview with Manitoba’s Frontier Centre for Public Policy, he made clear his belief that his argument also applies to Canada.16

Along with debates about the value of the shift from private to public provision and its causes has come a literature that questions whether the public-private division ever existed in the pure form that political ideologies assume. In 1995, Mariana Valverde made the beginnings of a
case for Canada having had, not a purely private welfare regime, but a “mixed social economy,”
with significant participation by government, since at least the mid-nineteenth century.17 Others
have followed in developing this thesis.18 In this view, governments have always participated in
welfare provision, whether through subsidy, regulation, licensing, criminal law, or direct service.
What has changed over time, and what is therefore a subject for historical inquiry, is the actual
blend of state and private citizen direction and financing. Thus, historians can study what
figuratively has been called the boundary or the frontier between the public and the private
provision of welfare.19

The most fully developed historical empirical study of a mixed social economy is Geoffrey
Finlayson’s 1994 publication, Citizen, State, and Social Welfare in Britain, 1830-1990. … The
varied picture of private agencies that Finlayson offers, even though it is specific to Britain,
informs my efforts in this book to depict federated fundraising within an encompassing world of
diverse private and public provision.

In addition to scholarship that reveals the diversity of the private side of the public-private
relation, there has also been valuable work on the many mechanisms by which the state has
taken a hand in voluntary enterprises. Here, some examples will suggest that there are common
patterns in the North Atlantic anglophone world, but also some significant national variation. In
Britain, for example, an early 19th century crisis surrounding the use of charitable endowments
led to the creation of a reformed and permanent Charity Commission, a national state agency that
oversaw these matters.20 However, in Canada, the constitutional location of welfare agencies
made any such national regulation impossible. Provinces incorporated particular charitable
societies and conferred quasi-police powers on some.21 But no province appears to have erected
an overarching regulatory framework for all charities; Quebec’s Public Charities Act of 1921 and
Ontario’s Charities Aid Act of 1874 did exercise some kind of control over thesubset of agencies
that received provincial grants. In Valverde’s depiction, the Ontario legislation quite effectively
enforced modern administrative practices. The comparable American regulatory apparatus, state
welfare boards, were, according to Robert Bremner, much less effective, unable to do more than
exercise “shadowy supervision” and to advise legislatures.22 The existence in the United States
of legal precedent that protected voluntary associations from state intervention set real limits on
the extent of government regulation. This same body of precedent made legal incorporation the
basis of charities’ autonomy.23 Thus, in the United States, federated fundraising’s national body
was, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Association of Community Chests and Councils, Incorporated.
In Canada, national coordination began, not with a legally incorporated enterprise, but with the
community organization division of the voluntary Canadian Welfare Council.24 Differences in tax
law also regulated philanthropy distinctively in Canada: for example, the 1930 amendment that
allowed Canadians to deduct charitable contributions from up to 10 per cent of their taxable
income came thirteen years after its more generous (15 per cent) equivalent American tax law.25
The federated fundraising movement was both American and Canadian, to be sure, and much
that I will say about the Canadian case may be true also of the American. But, as the examples
above begin to suggest, the constraints and possibilities set by the legal, institutional, and political
contexts of each country were significantly different.

A final dimension of the public and private relation in welfare is the role of the familial
private sphere. In this respect, the Canadian urban experience approximates the American and
British ones closely enough to make work done elsewhere on women, welfare, and social work
relevant to this study. This well-established literature shows that both public and private agencies
relied upon and helped to reinforce a breadwinner / housewife division of labour in family
welfare.26 …

It is remarkable, then, that women as fundraisers and donors do not appear in the most
recent Canadian study of this aspect of social work. In A Marriage of Convenience: business and
social work in Toronto, 1918-1957, Gale Wills has applied a gender analysis to the relationship of
fundraisers and service providers. In her interpretation, this relationship became a clash of
gender cultures, with a male-dominated business class championing business efficiency in
fundraising and spending against the feminine culture of the social work side, which valued social
efficiency, and emphasised planning and justice. Hers is a provocative and important thesis,
which makes persuasive sense of some of the events she describes.27 But it also overlooks
some of the positions and powers available to women in the financing, as distinct from the
service-delivery side, of private charity. The questions of women’s citizenship that were still so controversial in the period of the Chests’ origins made the gender politics of the welfare federations more complex, I will argue, than a social worker / businessman binary can capture. Wills has read back into the 1920s a political dynamic that is more helpful in understanding the 1950s. Moreover, the mixture of forces that shaped the relation of masculinity to fundraising for charity needs also to be explored if we are to understand the gender politics in this aspect of private welfare and the relation of private welfare to government and high politics.

If we consider the welfare federations as fundraising mechanisms and not, as Wills does, in light primarily of their goals of service, they become very useful means of viewing the multiple links between public and private welfare in the period of the welfare state’s formation. As I will show in chapter one, these organizations were created by people who hoped that the application of business methods to fundraising would both relieve pressure on existing donors and increase the funds available to existing charities, all while making the most efficient use of the time and effort of the social agencies’ staff and volunteers. In this hope, the promoters of federation very often spoke in both their private charity and public charity roles, i.e., both as donors and as taxpayers. Efficient charity, they anticipated, would help reduce and keep to a minimum the calls on tax-funded services of income assistance, child welfare, and health care. Some key figures also spoke both as fundraisers and as past, present, or aspiring politicians and civil servants. In these and other ways, the work of fundraising mixed commercial motives, power brokerage, policy activism, associational loyalties, and partisan networks. The federated appeals both used and were used by elements of the state, whether civil servants, police and hospital administrators, or politicians. They built on and sometimes challenged the private-sphere social relations on which much public policy was based. In short, the federated fundraising organizations formed a thick tissue of connections between private and public welfare worlds. And these connections worked more often in favour of state expansion than against it.

If the federated charities were so much a part of the formation of the welfare state, why is it that they have not been more centrally featured in the Canadian or the international welfare literature? The first reason may be that historians have been satisfied with early interpretations of the Chests as conservative forces that were necessarily left behind in the progress toward public provision. This is certainly how they figure in Robert H. Bremner’s 1960 American Philanthropy. But Bremner describes them only briefly, as he does for most of the topics in his short survey of a long subject.28 A fuller and more analytical treatment of federation in its first decades is the one Roy Lubove offered in his 1965 history of American social work. He presents the Chests as the high point of the bureaucratization and professionalization of social work and argues that, despite their early cooperative democracy rhetoric, they were a force that militated against voluntarism of the individualist sort and that regimented both canvassers and donors.29 Walter Trattner’s 1974 history of social welfare in the United States situates the federation movement in an explanation of why social work became more conservative in the 1920s, adding the sin of impeding reform to the federations’ fault in contributing to impersonal, bureaucratic social work.30 Daniel Walkowitz’s study of social work and middle class identity focuses, like Wills’s Toronto study, on the conflicts between social workers’ professional culture and the sometimes competing priorities of the businessmen who dominated the chests. In spite of the consensus in this American historiography, however, I am not convinced that the welfare federations were an unambiguously conservative force, at least not in Canada.

The neglect of the Chests is more profound in the Canadian literature than in the American. With the exception of Wills, Canadian welfare history has paid little attention to the Chests. Toronto’s Federation for Community Service and the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies appear in the background of several works, and Anne MacLennan, in addition to her M.A. on the Montreal Council of Social Agencies, has written a booklet-length commissioned history on that city’s anglophone federations in the period before their merger in 1972 with their francophone counterparts.31 These tangential treatments have been worthy exceptions to the general rule. But there are also important works that completely omit the fundraising story. Most notable is Dennis Guest’s survey, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada, which takes as its focus the description of the progressive increase of statutory programs and the recent threats to those developments. Guest stereotypes charity as “Dickensian,” making it a mere cartoon figure of what progress left behind. With his focus thus firmly on the system that apparently
replaced private charity, Guest does not describe developments in fundraising, and its role in the explanation of statutory change goes unexamined. More inexplicably, the federations are absent from Allan Irving and Patricia Daenzer’s article-length survey of the social work profession’s relation to unemployment policy. Focusing as they do on the Canadian Association of Social Workers, they might seem justified in their conclusion that “social workers moved out of the 1950s having made no significant contribution to policy direction.” But “social workers” are a larger group than the professionals in the CASW. Other organizations, namely the fundraising federations and their associated welfare councils, would seem to represent social work more broadly defined, to include not only social workers from member agencies, but also fundraisers, volunteers, and donor interests. Closer attention to the work of these organizations brings to light considerable and effective policy activism on the part of social work in the 1950s.

One notable feature of welfare studies has made it easy for Canadian social work scholars to overlook the importance of the welfare federations. International comparison is methodologically central to welfare research, and most of the countries to which Canadians usually compare ourselves – Britain, Scandinavia, Australia, Germany, and France – did not take up the federated fundraising system. The only real point of comparison is to the United States. In Lubove’s account of the movement’s American origins, the associated charities, when transplanted to the New World, were rendered into a new hybrid by means of a distinctively American voluntarist graft, found only on this side of the Atlantic. If the organizers of federated fundraising were Progressives of a sort, they were not, however, those importers of European ideas that Daniel T. Rodgers has described. They seem, in fact, to have been exceptions to the European trend when they created the welfare federations, even if the logic of rationalization that they embraced was part of the larger Progressive culture that was shared across the Atlantic. A distinctively American element of anti-statism marked the Chests at their origins. The extent of that element in the whole of the American federated fundraising movement is beyond the scope of this study to determine. But a Canadian study can help illuminate the subject. After all, American influence was always present in 20th century Canadian welfare history. Social workers, volunteer and professional, participated in conferences and associations and labour markets in which the Canada-U.S. border was largely invisible. To study the Chests in Canada allows us to see how the range of available policy ideas was produced in a country that was part of the American social work sphere, even while not being politically, institutionally, or culturally exactly like the United States. The history of the federated fundraising movement draws our attention, not to Atlantic crossings, then, but to border crossings at the forty-ninth parallel.

Perhaps the most fundamental and important reason for scholarly neglect of the fundraising federations has to do with definitions of the welfare state and the political priorities of welfare historians. Not only in Canada, but also in welfare history generally, the focus on income assistance, and in particular, on unemployment relief, helped to make the Chests invisible to the generations of historians who were formed politically and intellectually in the 1960s and later. In the 1960s and 1970s, the New Left made a compelling critique of the helping services as mechanisms by which the dominant classes imposed their values on others and sought to preserve their wealth and privilege. In this critique, the path to a better welfare state (if such a path existed other than through revolution) seemed to lie straightforwardly in programs that redistributed wealth to the working class. In the short term, this meant that struggles to improve income assistance were politically central. From this viewpoint, the United Appeal federations of the 1960s were at best irrelevant. Although the Chests had helped to fund relief-giving agencies in the 1920s and 1930s, the United Appeals of the 1950s tried to get away from funding income support. By the 1960s and 1970s, they had largely succeeded in doing so. Their member agencies provided counselling, advocacy, recreation, health education, crisis intervention, and a diverse array of other services. It is easy to see how they might thus have seemed of little interest to those interested in the politics of income. In recent years, however, social agencies have returned to the center of welfare planning, as we discuss the financing of and need for services such as home care, transition houses, suicide prevention, foster care for children, addiction treatment, child day care, and community integration of people with disabilities. Once the importance of this aspect of welfare work comes into focus, then the Chests and their successor organization, the United Way, re-emerge as part of the main story of the welfare state. And understanding the historical relations of the welfare federations and the state then becomes
a means of thinking anew, and less dismissively, about the relationships, actual and theoretical, between social services and income assistance, care and relief.

If studying modern charitable fundraising can help improve our explanation of how and why public provision changed, it is because the relation between voluntary associations and government is not as distinct as American-influenced political ideology would have us think.36 In making this observation, I am drawing on various bodies of Foucauldian, Gramscian, and feminist social and political theory.37 In different specialized vocabularies, each of these bodies of theory offer tools for analysing a common problem: how do we describe, so as to explain, changes in freedom and constraint, oppression and liberation, if we no longer believe liberal simplicities? If state and society interpenetrate and government is not the only source of tyranny or guarantor of security, how do we understand more complex nets of limitation and possibility, and their effect on events, now and historically?

In *Contributing Citizens*, I tell a story that shows how some significantly situated Canadians answered that question. Fundraisers faced both toward the state and toward society: the economy and popular culture, family and associational life. In relation to each of these fields of reference and social relations, they found obstacles to and opportunities for their project. Taking their material from these fields, they shaped notions of need, authority, obligation, and resources. These notions in turn became available to other social actors, including politicians and other policy-makers. Different sets of conceptual tools and terms served as pathways for this traffic between fundraisers, the state, and other elements of civil society. These trails and tacks included religions, social sciences, political ideologies, and managerial models. While such systems each have a native habitat, so to speak, they also have the capacity for metaphorical redeployment. Consequently, they are able to cross over the boundary between society and the state, between public and private life, or between market relations and personal ones. For example, family obligations can be taken as models in political life, and vice versa. Efficiency in organizing industrial production may offer analogies for social organization. Because of this metaphorical capacity for translating experience between supposedly distinct fields of life, terms that are drawn from various large conceptual systems help to organize the interactions among their native fields and others. Fundraising as a project required of its performers that they operate effectively in relation to a very wide array of social fields, and interact with multiple layers of the state. As a result, they became adept at translating their project into multiple languages: religious, commercial, familial, social scientific, and political. To trace how a major charitable fundraising movement framed its project and pursued it over four decades, then, is to watch from the front bench the development of the relations between the state and multiple dimensions of society.38 Narrative makes it possible to explain the interaction and relations of determination among different kinds of human organization – economic, cultural, political – in networks of various sizes – interpersonal, urban, national, and international.

My conception of the power relations involved in these narratives comes, in general, from Gramscian cultural materialism, although there is a Foucauldian element to my analysis as well.39 I have investigated the use by fundraisers, donors, and others of appeals to common cultural terms, in tandem with the coercive tools available – police, economic leverage, and control of access to material and social resources – in order to coordinate collective action for purpose of wielding power. This investigation is Marxist, insofar as I see the tools of coercion as distributed differentially among structurally defined classes or class fractions, in ways that tend to determine all power relations. But I have also been attentive to the non-class interests and resources for power are sometimes economic in the narrow sense and sometimes not. Combined with a focus on economic interests and economic resources for exercising power, this view of power has enabled me to explain most of the changes that charitable fundraisers made in their own methods and, over time, the consequences of fundraising activity in building support for tax-based programs.

But I have not always found the relations of determination between the ideological or cultural work and the interests and powers of the parties involved to be analysable solely in material terms or illuminated by taking interests and resources as given by social position. While this is very commonly so, there are also aspects of the story which seem more Foucauldian in
their logic. That is to say, the story here includes, not just the use of available tools for power, whether discursive or coercive, in the pursuit of interest, but also the consequences of changes in the tools themselves. It seems that changes in the tools of power can alter the definition of the problems (including interests worth pursuing) to which the exercise of power is addressed. In other words, some of my questions are about whether and how tools alter strategies. The tools I consider are mainly the social technologies: the routine practices of publicity, organization, and the representation and management of data.

In this sort of analysis, cultural and material realities are related in ways that can only be seen by means of both local micro-history and broad-brush cultural, economic and political description. The design of the research and of the book thus reflects my general interest in analysing the interactions among levels of social and political organization. I have studied, in local history terms, the politics and personalities, conditions and circumstances, of the federated fundraising movement in three Canadian cities: Vancouver, Ottawa, and Halifax. In each of these cases, I was fortunate to be able to build on the work of two scholarly generations of urban historians interested in welfare, elites, gender, and labour. In this study, Vancouver represents the top tier of Canadian cities, whose fundraising history shows what was possible and impossible for large, wealthy, and nationally significant community elites. Vancouver as a case study had also the advantage of a well-studied and politically engaged labour movement, which made more easily visible the competing and converging class ideologies of charity. Ottawa was chosen from among other central Canadian cities for its combination of francophone and anglophone communities, a key element of Canadian political culture in the formative years of the welfare state. Ottawa was also simply a more manageable size than the other “bi-cultural” city, Montreal. For studying the Ottawa Chest, there was also the advantage of the presence of Charlotte Whitton as a player during its organizing years and, later, her more peripheral involvement as Mayor. This leading Canadian social worker was a prolific, thorough, and frank correspondent on all sorts of welfare questions, and so her papers provide detailed descriptions of the Chests’ organizational strategies. Halifax, the city where I have lived during my research for this book, had the advantages of proximity, but more importantly the benefits of a small scale: here, more easily than in Ottawa or Vancouver, I could decipher the politics of elite networks. In regional terms, an equally adequate (and equally inadequate) approach might have used Montreal, Hamilton, and Winnipeg. It may be that Canada cannot be truly represented by any partial sample of its various regions, and that a complete sample of every important regional variation may be impossible in one volume. In that sense, Canada may not be a manageable object of generalization. But the sample I have used is based on the belief that, for the history of charity and the welfare state, to have considered only Montreal or Toronto would have entailed mistaking local politics for national ones.

The detail and texture that local history methods offer this study are complemented by the efforts I have made to see the events in particular cities in relation to national and international developments. It was not difficult to see the effects of these larger systems in each of my cities. Whether through the field workers of the Canadian Welfare Council, or through the movement of professional social workers among these cities for their own career reasons, social workers acted as transmission vectors for national and international ideas. Another source of broader influences was the impact in each of these cities of controversies about fundraising or other welfare questions that erupted in Toronto or Montreal, New York or Detroit. These controversies were reported in the national mass circulation press and broadcasting media and were taken up at conferences and in social work and business publications. Other national networks also reflected and influenced the strategies of specific welfare federations. Fundraisers in each of these cities, while responding to local conditions, were also influenced by the nationally or internationally devised projects of the labour movement, the service clubs, the first wave women’s movement, social scientists, and political parties, to name some of the most central I have identified. By combining the methods of local and national history, I have tried to bridge a gap which has troubled those of us who, though trained as social historians, regret the limitations of history with the politics left out.

In analysing the cultural world in which all of these groups operated, I have borrowed the methods of intertextual analysis from literary theory. Intertextual analysis is based on a theory about how cultural products are made and have their effects. This theory posits that we
understand any particular text only in relation to other similar kinds of speech and writing in its contemporary world or its genre tradition. On this assumption, to understand fundraising rhetoric we need to look at other kinds of persuasive texts, and in particular, those texts whose purpose was to induce their audience to exchange dollars in return for a mix of personal and social benefit. The method of intertextual analysis is primarily useful for understanding how local strategies were affected by national and international currents in the methods of advertising (especially for insurance), public relations, and electoral politics. Borrowings and allusions among these different textual worlds help explain what cultural producers thought would be effective in each. Whether or not they were right was measurable in funds raised, market share captured, and votes won. Among fundraisers, as among advertisers and politicians, no one could ever be sure that these effects were solely the results of their efforts or entirely within their control. But in each of these fields, men and women relied on their intuitive (and later social scientific) readings of what would work, and were admired as successful when the results confirmed that they had read well the anxieties, hopes, and needs of their publics. What was successful in one realm was certain to be appealing to practitioners of other, related genres.

I conclude, in the end, that the tools that modernizing fundraisers developed had the effect of increasing charitable giving, as they had hoped. But they also, unintentionally, helped to make the financing, the administrative methods, and the justice standards of the welfare state more acceptable. Pointing to this unintended effect is not merely an exercise in making bitter fun of short-sighted businessmen and their middle-class wives, widows, and daughters. Rather, I want to show how politically fertile the federated fundraisers’ project was. They attempted to combine in a common action a diverse array of social groups, all of whom exercised some degree of real material power, and who cherished conflicting ideologies. In orchestrating common action, the fundraisers were forced into a search for common ground. They found it, but at the price of promoting double-barrelled, seemingly paradoxical ideals – sentiment and reason, particularity and universality, altruism and self-interest, personal care and abstract rights, communitarianism and individual freedom. Once the fundraisers fashioned and purveyed such a complex and ambiguous discourse, and tested it in the field for its power to extract dollars from donors, it is only a small wonder that their enterprise fed other, and (to some of them) unwelcome innovations in state formation.

**Contributing Citizens** is, then, a story of a project, its struggles, and its transformation. Chapters one and two describe the project, its proponents, and the circumstances from which it grew. In these two chapters, I establish the common moral and conceptual framework that links taxation and charity, the culture of contribution. I also present examples of the sort of people who could be found promoting both Community Chests and tax reform. In chapter one, Halifax represents the beginning of the Chest movement. The development of the Chest idea into a movement is the subject of chapters three and four. The concepts of fair contribution and efficient management were sold and promoted by means of intense political and cultural work in the highly charged circumstances of the 1930s. In chapter three, Vancouver serves as the focus for my discussion of the cultural politics entailed in selling the Chest idea, and Ottawa, in chapter, illustrates the deployment of the sharp and dirty tools of local politics in the service of this ideal of welfare provision. By the end of chapter four, the Community Chests, created in a world where reformed charity seems to have a chance of forestalling the welfare state, are established, and appear as both an alternative to the welfare state and its prototype.

In chapter four, the strategic circumstances of fundraising shift. The Chests felt themselves on the defensive, in context of the competing war charities, the creation of unemployment insurance and family allowances, and the apparent promise of a more systematic welfare state for Canada. While local stories continue to feature in my narrative, and to count in reality, the scale of the remainder of the book is national. So, too, by this time, was the emerging welfare system. In chapter five, I look back to the national debate in the 1930s over the role of private charity, and then show how challenges of the war years, such as rising social work salaries, exceptional demands from the member agencies, and flat out refusals to donate, made a fundamental reframing of the public-private relationship necessary. After the war, as I show in chapter six, it remained to be established whether this new form of the relationship could be made to work. I explain how it was that the Chests neither collapsed in the face of reconstruction crises nor found themselves reduced to insignificance by an aggressive state. I show that they
were essential players in post-war state formation, and in particular, in the creation of the federal Unemployment Assistance Act in 1956 and the Canada Assistance Program in 1966. Finally, in chapter seven, I return to the cultural dimension of the public-private relationship, to discuss the relationship between principles of justice and practices of care. Against the dichotomous thinking that associated the former with statutory entitlement and the latter with charity, I argue that the post-war Chests managed to contribute to a welfare state culture of universal entitlements and inclusive citizenship – a culture of justice – while also attempting to preserve for charity a role in promoting care. Faced with post-war donor fatigue, they invented more coercive pressures, increased their discursive borrowing from consumerist models, and devised ever more abstract images of need. In all of these cultural tactics, the fundraisers again demonstrated that private means of legitimating contribution were not very different from public ones.

Overall, what I hope to show in this book is that the welfare federations became an institution through which a modern common sense about social obligation and its appropriate expression emerged. By means of the fundraisers’ work, a modern citizenship of contribution was constructed in tandem with the period’s growing citizenship of entitlement. The Chests operated within a local framework, but were also positioned on the national social and political stage, increasingly so in the 1950s. Ideas about social obligation flowed into the Chest movement not only from intellectuals in universities, but also from international service clubs and business organizations, from international unions, from churches and synagogues, and from Chest canvassers meeting individual Canadians and reporting back on this experience. The mechanisms of reporting and strategic analysis which framed the canvassers’ work produced a flow of information into the planning processes of the Chests and out again into the community in the form of fundraising rhetoric. The result was significant innovations in ways of both knowing and shaping what a community could afford to give and what images of need would incite increased donations.

In their increasing but never entirely successful efforts to be inclusively representative and publicly accountable, the welfare federations resembled a kind of democratic government. More inclusive by the 1950s even than any institutional religion, these organizations brought into an interactive relationship Canadians from different classes, genders, ethnicities, and ages. Then as now, they were a training ground or a staging platform for political careers, legitimately so because they provided opportunities for people to demonstrate the kinds of leadership power and community responsibility that were valued in their time. The significance of the welfare federations thus rests on the most general claim that this book advances, that the work of governing and the activity of citizenship were and are shaped by a common cultural framework.

This is more than just a point of theoretical interest. It suggests that, once a spirit of individualism or a family-only model of social obligation takes hold in economic relations, cultural rhetoric, or electoral politics, it cannot easily be confined to its original habitat. It seems that, whatever conception of self and society is current in one of these spheres will be communicated, often by fundraisers or their critics, to the others. This interconnectedness may explain why Swedes are enthusiastic participants in voluntary organizations, but also elect welfarist politicians. Similarly, it might suggest why the Japanese support neither social spending by their governments nor a large non-profit sector. And the difficulties in Russia of establishing private charitable giving as a norm also make sense in this light. They follow very clearly from problems that affect both democratic state formation and the organization of civil society alike – expectations of cheating, suspicion of the needy, fear of coerced contribution. At the very least, the connections that I demonstrate between public and private modes of contribution should make us wary of assertions that an anti-tax position is necessarily a position in favour of private charitable giving. We do not decide separately in private benevolence and public citizenship the questions around social responsibility and individual obligation. We answer these questions both through charity and taxation, from a common culture of contribution.

Chapter 1 – The culture of contribution in the 1920s

Chapter 2 – The technologies of contribution: taxation and modern fundraising
Conclusion

Similarities, differences, and historical change

This book has told a story made of stories. It begins in 1920s Halifax, where, in a shattered city, the problem of financing social services was both a taxation problem and a fundraising one. Handfield Whitman and his Board of Trade friends persuaded the men and, especially, the women who were running charities that the federation would solve both the chronic and the acute problems of balancing their agencies’ budgets. As chapter two argues, a certain measure of Whitman’s persuasiveness came from the kind of tools he and his cohort proposed to use. Innovations such systematic accounting, a disciplined sales force, and arithmetical formulae for giving appealed, because of their effectiveness in business and public administration, to an audience of business men and newly-enfranchised middle class women who were seeking acceptance in their new status as citizens. Still, the fundraisers faced the challenge of convincing everyone else that their show was worth applauding. For this, advertising and public relations techniques come into play. In Vancouver, the fundraisers put on their show in front of an exceptionally tough audience. There was audible heckling from the left and from a well-connected women’s organization. Nevertheless, the show went on, and the paying audience grew. Donor numbers increased, suggesting strongly that people were attracted by the Welfare Federation’s message of individuality and community, probity and pity.

But the federation movement was more than just the display entailed in the annual campaign. The Chests were also decision-making, deliberative institutions whose representativeness was meant to provide a deep and solid foundation of inclusive participation, one which would legitimate the planning function of the Chest and incite contributions to the work of its member agencies. In this work, the interwar years were not especially encouraging. In Vancouver, the integration of the Catholic Charities proved unmanageable, and in Ottawa, the Protestant organizers collaborated with the anglophone Catholics to force a confederal merger on the franco-Ottawan community. Halifax made only minor efforts to reach out to wage earners and Catholics, and apparently made no offer at all to include the Nova Scotia Home for Coloured Children as a member agency. In all three cities, coercion was never far away from the attempts made to include labour. Nothing in the Chest idea at its origins indicated an impulse to transform inequalities among social groups.

Charlotte Whitton’s solution to the cross-cultural impasse in Ottawa was the closest that the Chest project came to confronting the structural social differences in the Canadian cities studied here. Elsewhere, the idea that “everyone” should and could participate in this project reduced social complexities and variations in giving power to a moral binary – the selfish and the unselfish. On one hand, this kind of thinking was profoundly conservative, tending to reinforce social hierarchies. A poor showing from the industrial neighbourhoods of Halifax made it possible for business-based fundraisers to disparage wage earners and their families. If the Vancouver
firemen could stump up a decent collective donation, then it could be made to seem that other workers were just morally substandard. On the other hand, though, the idea of universal participation was rich in democratic potential. Combine it with the view that contribution entitled the donor to a voice, and it was not a very long walk to the place where unionists were on committees that were designing a new, and smaller place for charity in the welfare state. Edward Jamieson’s Coordinating committee in the Vancouver Chest, Fred Ibsen’s call for the Halifax Chest to address labour in labour terms, Moses McKay’s work as a paid labour liaison officer for the Chest -- these were all part of a changed landscape in the social politics of Canadian cities during and after the second World War. The successful inclusion of organized labour in the Chests in the 1950s was a move towards more democratic communities.

The federation movement also had mixed effects in the world of middle class gender relations. On one hand, the modernization of charity was also a masculinization. Women leaders such as Vancouver’s Helen Gregory McGill, Halifax’s Gwendolen Lantz, or Ottawa’s Thelma Williams were all sidelined, some more gently than others, in the post-war years. They had been used to a welfare regime that was fuelled in large measure by the low paid or volunteer labour of women. But as Canadians became more and more persuaded of the value of social services, the demand for social work labour began to force wages up, and they began to be breadwinner wages. The increasing prestige of enterprises such as the Chests and the expanding Children’s Aid Societies also made their staff positions men’s jobs. At the same time, however, women volunteers such as Ann Angus and Lillian Farquahar continued to occupy leadership roles in the planning and publicity work of the Chests. Indeed, middle class women’s association with this kind of large scale charity enterprise probably gave them a wider scope for their abilities. Their role in the 1950s was not to be hived off in a separate women’s campaign headquarters. Conflicts between the agencies, represented by social workers, and the Chests, dominated by businessmen, could and sometimes did have a bitter edge of gender conflict in the 1950s. But these conflicts nonetheless were also contests between political programs and institutional interests, rather than being directly about whether or not women should have a voice in public affairs. The addition of ambitious young men to the ranks of leadership in private charity was hard on the careers of women social workers, but not a bad thing for the weight of influence the Chests could bring to bear in public policy processes.

By the mid-1950s, the Chests were a well-established institution in urban Canada. Their leaders and many, many volunteers had succeeded in making a new structure for the financing of social services. Alas, while fighting with every means at their disposal to meet the needs of social agencies, they frequently failed to do so. When the cities’ brightest business and professional talent could claim that they had done their best, then the very competence, creativity, and energy of the Chest staff and volunteers helped to make the case that voluntary means were inadequate to meet social need. First, in the 1950s, this argument was used by fundraisers such as Hugh Allan to improve or create income assistance programs. Then, in the 1960s, the same logic led to the federal-provincial financing of services such as the Children’s Aid Societies, with the Halifax CAS saga forming part of the material that decision-makers considered. It was true, then, that the inadequacy of private charity led to the creation of the welfare state, in these quite specific ways. But that inadequacy was not as clear in the struggling 1930s as it was in the affluent 1950s. And it was always the combination of effectively deployed expertise with insufficient revenue results that made the Chests influential in state formation. What made the case for more public funding convincing were the several decades of hard fought charity campaigns. The Chests’ enormous success in increasing participation and multiplying many times over the amounts collected was the evidence needed to show that even the most determined fundraisers could not meet the needs that Canadians were coming to believe must be met.

Finally, the story that ends this story also launched a new one. By the late 1950s, the Chests had become an established institution. The Red Feather appeal, as their annual campaigns were generally known, were part of North American urban culture. These campaigns allowed people to participate in a ritual of caring, inclusive community. But the very established nature of the Appeals made them a target for critics of complacency and conformity. Along with the now-forgotten Rev. Jenkins, another, now better known controversialist of the period, journalist Pierre Berton, took on the fundraisers before he took on spiritually empty Christianity in
his 1965 book *The Comfortable Pew*. The United Appeals were an attractive target because of the contradictions that had emerged over the thirty or more years of their existence. Supposedly about care, they had been repeatedly and convincingly criticized for their inability to set meetable campaign targets that actually reflected what the social agencies said was needed.

The United Appeal leadership had become thoroughly practiced in meeting such criticisms. Addressing their critics in the 1960s, they would point to the record of increased government spending on welfare during their existence and claim credit for having goaded government into doing better and spending more. They acknowledged that the agencies’ needs were not always met, but argued that the fundraisers could only generate a consistent source of charitable donations if goals were meetable and campaigns therefore successful. It had become the settled commonsense within United Appeal campaign circles that the campaign goals were the result of exercises in compromise. Implied in this response was an allegation that their critics simply lacked the ability to find the reasonable middle point, and so were not sufficiently mature to be competent actors in public life. This view of their critics was made explicit in 1969 when Victoria’s campaign Chairman replied to criticisms from an NDP MLA, social worker Dave Barrett. Barrett had said of the UA campaign: “What a sham, what a mockery, what a sixteenth century attitude toward community social welfare services.” The fundraiser retorted: “I’ve known [Barrett] since he was a little wet-nosed kid – I hope one day he grows up.”

A celebration of the campaigns as expressions of compromise was bound to inflame opposition in the political climate of the mid-to-late 1960s. Maturity and compromise were not especially valued skills among some important actors new on the political scene. One of those new actors was the Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA). A 1965 CBC current affairs show, directed by Ted Koch, used the SUPA and the youthful, uncompromising style of its activists as a point of contrast to the United Appeal’s place as part of the Establishment. The opening shots highlighted the proximity of the Appeal’s Toronto headquarters to Queen’s Park, and the script’s neutral description of the organization took on a disparaging tone because it was accompanied by footage of a mechanized mailing list being cranked out by the latest office automation technology. The contrast to SUPA was succinctly expressed by a SUPA volunteer saying her work was not about “replacing a system with another system.” Giving directly of your own time and energy to help solve community problems was, for the SUPA and other new social movements, more likely to produce socially just solutions than would giving money to the Chest.

Faced with this sort of criticism, one response by the Chests was to try to include representatives of the new social movements in the Chests’ planning process, just as labour had been engaged in the 1940s and 1950s. This time, the strategy backfired, sometimes loudly. For example, Vancouver Chest Board member Alex Bandy, representing a welfare rights agency called the Unemployed Citizens Welfare Improvement Council, described the annual appeal on campaign kick-off day as “a charade that provides big business with a tax dodge and cheap public relations.” Even though some of the goals of the welfare rights movement — to make the welfare state more democratic and to extract adequate income assistance from government — were compatible with the Chest tradition, others were not. It would not be possible to integrate into the federated fundraising movement goals that entailed explicitly challenging “the system” — capitalist market relations, electoral democracy, mediating voluntary associations. Its founders had hoped the Community Chests would become, in effect, part of the power structure of Canadian cities, and they had succeeded. As a result, the Chests were in no position to entertain seriously goals that were not compatible within the assumptions of the chief beneficiaries of “the system.” But it is worth noting that the defenders of charity, faced with attacks from the left, did not retort with criticism of the welfare state or with assertions of their contribution to keeping taxes low. Instead, their defense lay in their continuing contribution to expansion of the democratic welfare state.

In the four decades that this book covers, comparisons between charity and the state formed the commonsense substrate of debates about social policy. In these contests, the point being made by comparing public and private was typically that one or the other of these systems for providing food, shelter, and help was entirely better than the other. The assumption was that they were fundamentally different systems. I have argued, however, that there were deep similarities in the categories and assumptions of private and public systems. Whether it was the data collection methods, the universalist conception of the contributors, the evolution of a
consumer standpoint in place of a stockholder one, or the abstraction of the “less privileged” into rights-holders or sentimentalized tokens -- the organizing conceptions of obligation, voice, and need were shared across the public-private divide. Both modern charity and the welfare state rested on a common culture of contribution, even though within that culture fierce ideological divisions were possible.

In these ideological contests, three points of contrast have been particularly important: reason versus feeling, compulsion versus freedom, and democratic accountability versus self-interested or arbitrary elite governance. None of these are simple descriptions of historical fact about public or private provision. Consider, first, reason versus feeling. The Chests used charitable emotion in their fundraising campaigns, to be sure, but their participation in modern rationalistic administrative culture was clearly apparent in their commitment to planning, their careful assessments of donor capacity, their assessment of needs on the basis of research, their orchestration of combined action by thousands of volunteers, and many other ways. Some of their early activists, such as Ivor Jackson, defined the Federation project explicitly against older models of charity in which wealthy individuals luxuriated in the pleasures of personal benevolence. And if the Chests were deeply committed to rationality, it is easy to point to ways in which the state was not. For instance, in comparison to the Chests’ budget allocation processes, the setting of social services budgets based on electoral calculations substitutes one calculation, perhaps based in ambition or other aggressive desires, for one based at least partly in a feeling of helpful interest and concern. The desire to get one’s party re-elected is no more purely rational than the wish to see the VON better staffed. And the fear and dislike of social assistance recipients evident in some public actors – civil servants or politicians – hardly suggests that a clear-headed rationality was always guiding the hand of the state. Even benefits that are conferred as of right come from policy processes in which both fear and compassion play their parts, and few, if any, of our income assistance programs have been administered without some measure of discretion. Even in the most “rational” programs of the welfare state, emotions, charitable and otherwise, have played a part. In this way, public and private were not so different.

Next, consider compulsion versus freedom. Surely, compulsion has clearly distinguished taxation from charity, public from private funding. One can choose one’s charities but not one’s tax contribution. As the critics of the Chest method pointed out, however, fundraisers had some effective means of coercion at their disposal. Some, such as social pressure among peers, were considered fair. Others, particularly between employers and workers or between businesses and their bigger customers, were the subject of protest. A nurse recently arrived in Canada from Great Britain in the late 1950s described the routine of getting paid at the Royal Victoria Hospital. Lining up with the other nurses to get their pay envelopes, she was surprised to find, standing next to the payroll clerk, the hospital’s head nurse, asking her what her donation to the Red Feather appeal would be. The compulsion she experienced in this moment was less easy to evade than the impersonal pressures that the Department of National Revenue could bring to bear by the threat of auditing a business’s books. Still, it is true that the taxman had the police and the courts at his disposal, and the punishments for evading tax could be severe. Further research into tax evasion and enforcement will be necessary before we can offer a definitive picture of just how far paying taxes was effectively compelled, and how far a willingness to pay – genuine voluntarism – has featured in the history of 20th century taxation. With an empirical rather than mythic version of that story, we would be able to say how great a difference in voluntaryness lay between direct taxation and charity during the debates about the financing of welfare at mid-century.

Finally, and most compellingly, another certain objection to claims about the similarity of public and private is that, however well-researched and rationally planned the spending of charitable dollars may have been in the hands of the Chests, and however coercive their methods, the fact is that the people who made the spending decisions were self-appointed and were therefore less accountable to the popular will than were government decision-makers. This objection is right, on the point of fact. The question raised by this point of fact, however, is whether the processes that legitimated decisions of public policy makers, and their enforcement, were more democratic than the decisions made by the volunteer leadership of the Community Chests. The democratic character of elected government in 20th century North America has been the subject of a large literature and considerable debate. The removal of decision making from
law-makers to bureaucrats, the vitiating of election campaigns by public relations gamesmanship, and the role of party finance in compromising politicians’ responsiveness to the full range of interests among the electorate have all been sources of concern about the health of 20th century democracy. Set against these concerns about electoral democracy, the Chests’ deliberative bodies, by the mid-1950s, do not seem to be so much less representative of and responsive to the public than Parliament. In proximity to their publics, an important means of accountability, they were better.

If public and private financing of provision were not so thoroughly and necessarily separate and not so different in mid-twentieth century Canada, what should we make of the ferocious ideological debates about the merits of the two? Were the participants in these debates merely hiding material interests behind a façade of political debate, engaging either in mystification or self-delusion? The story of the Chests certainly supports the view that there were economic interests such as tax reduction or income redistribution at play. But the story of the manifold interactions between the charities and government and the use of common cultural tools also suggests that the ideological debates about similarity and difference had an additional, important effect in state formation. Let us look at a summary list of the main qualities attributed to public and private during the 20th century welfare debates, from the statist and anti-statist viewpoints:

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<th>PUBLIC</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
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<td>STATIST</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rational</td>
<td>Sentimental</td>
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<tr>
<td>Universalist</td>
<td>Particularist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inclusive</td>
<td>Exclusive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratically governed</td>
<td>Elite-governed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
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<td>Professional</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANTI-STATIST</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td>Caring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arbitrary</td>
<td>Sensitive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corrupt</td>
<td>Responsible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spiritually empty</td>
<td>Religious</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dangerously experimental</td>
<td>Time-tested</td>
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<tr>
<td>Self-interested</td>
<td>Altruistic</td>
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<td>Compulsory</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
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The fundraisers’ use of this discourse was innovative. They claimed for private charity both the positive attributions from the anti-statist binaries and also those made for the public in the statist pairs. In different strategic contexts, before and after the creation of the major national incomes programs and the broad-based income tax, the purposes this mixed discourse served for the fundraisers changed. In the earlier period, the prevention of state expansion predominated, and in the latter period, the preservation of private charitable organizations was central. Both purposes were effectively served by describing complex human phenomena in simplified ways.

Rather than dismissing this fundraising discourse as merely misrepresentation and mystification, however, we should see it as having valuably contributed to the cultural context for state formation. The effect of charities’ defending their existence in terms that they shared with the proponents of state expansion was to help organize the co-existence of and collaborative action between the agencies of the state and the organizations of civil society.58 The eliciting of donations and the winning of votes both depended on presenting a welfare enterprise in culturally-endorsed terms. In the rhetorical work of both the Chest fundraisers and their critics we see being made and tested the terms in which a democratic welfare state could be established, and consent to its imposition of taxation be secured. This process is not finished. Both politicians and fundraisers will continue to talk about obligation and care, efficiency and accountability,
inclusion and responsiveness. Neither private charity nor public rights naturally embody all of these or other imaginable democratic virtues. And, while binaries may be necessary both as a tool of thinking and as a tool of politics, reality is not so neatly arranged in pairs. With their ideologically messy and multifaceted methods, the Chests blurred political binaries and creatively contributed to historical change.
The major centres were Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. The smaller ones were Ottawa, Halifax, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Regina.

Like these, the twentieth century federations sought to coordinate the actions of multiple charities. But the twentieth century federations were purely fundraising and budgetting organizations: unlike Charities Organization Societies, Community Chests had no visitors or caseworkers on staff, only fundraisers and bookkeepers, and in some cases, planners.

Roy Lubove, The Professional Altruist: The Emergence of Social Work as a Carer, 1880-1930 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 194–91; Gale Wills, A Marriage of Convenience: Business and Social Work in Toronto, 1918-1957 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) 41–3; Anne MacLennan, Red Feather in Montreal: A History (Montreal: Red Feather Foundation, 1996), 3–9. The Montreal and Toronto Federations of Jewish Philanthropies were commonly credited with being Canada’s firsts (see, for example, J. Irving Oelbaum, “Community Chest,” Canadian Welfare, 24, 7 (1949); National Archives of Canada, Canadian Welfare Council, “Who is my Neighbour?” [film]), possibly Speisman’s Jews of Toronto. However, in the Montreal case, the FJP in 1917 was in reality an associated charities organization. The fundraising element was added in 1923 when a businessmen’s committee was created to take up this responsibility: Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives, MB1/B/11, Seventh annual report of the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies of Montreal and Constituent Societies (1923), 4 and 7)

This paper's discussion of the "Chest Idea" draws on the records relating to the initial organizational efforts in the 1920s of the Halifax and Vancouver federated appeals. These are mainly to be found in two collections: Public Archives of Nova Scotia (PANS), MG20, Records of the United Way of Halifax-Dartmouth and City of Vancouver Archives (CVA), Vancouver Board of Trade, Add. MSS 300. In the first of these two collections, the key documents are in vol. 1717, a scrapbook. See especially the clippings for May 1925. For the second of these two collections, the key documents are in vol. 5, p. 319, report by W.C. Woodward, chairman of the Retail Merchants' Bureau of the Vancouver Board of Trade, 4 May 1922; vol. 146, insert at p. 44 "Minutes of meeting of Organizations called to receive a report prepared by the special committee re Community Chest," 26 June 1923; vol. 8, insert at p. 487, "Minutes of a Special meeting of the Council of the Vancouver Board of Trade," 8 November, 1928; and "Expert Urges Chest System of Charities," Vancouver Star, 13 August 1929, p. 7. Some of the same themes appear in the origins of Toronto's Federation for Community Service, described in Jacquelyn Gale Wills, "Efficiency, Feminism, and Co-operative Democracy: Origins of the Toronto Social Planning Council, 1918-1957," Ph.D. thesis (Social Work), University of Toronto, 1989.

I do not mean here the War Income Tax that was launched in 1917 – it applied to a very small percentage of the Canadian population. See chapter 1 for a further discussion.


footnote for Jones


13 Ellis W. Hawley, for example, notes the parallels between the prescriptions of contemporary American conservatives and the partnership strategies of President Herbert Hoover and goes on to argue that the failure of the Hoover strategy in the 1930s has relevant lessons for today’s politics: “Herbert Hoover, Associationalism, and the Great Depression Relief Crisis of 1930–1933,” in Donald T. Critchlow and Charles H. Parker, eds., *With Us Always: A History of Private Charity and Public Welfare* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 161–90

14 In a distinctive variation of this option, David Hammack argues, to continue the metaphor, that philanthropy bounced. That is, various forms of donor-funded social services found new fundraising strategies that helped them to continue to be useful, if not to meet all the needs of the unemployed in the 1930s, and indeed to expand in the 1940s. David C. Hammack, “Failure and Resilience: Pushing the Limits in Depression and Wartime,” in Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie, eds., *Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in American History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 263–280


18 Lynne Marks, “Personal Ties and Poor Relief in Small Town Ontario,” *Studies in Political Economy*, 47 (Summer 1995), 61–87; Margaret Little, “Charity and the Moral Regulation
Charities: Church and State in Toronto’s Catholic Archdiocese, 1850–1950 (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2003; Shirley Tillotson, The Public at Play: Gender and the Politics of
Recreation on Postwar Ontario (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000); Renée Lafferty,
[thesis title], (Ph.D., History, Dalhousie University, 2003); 5

19 Several collections, both historical and interdisciplinary, make this their unifying
question, and others touch on it extensively. in Donald T. Critchlow and Charles H. Parker, eds.,
With Us Always: A History of Private Charity and Public Welfare (New York: Rowman and
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul, eds. The
Welfare State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). See also Jane Lewis, The
Voluntary Sector, the State and Social Work in Britain: The Charity Organisation Society / Family
Welfare Association since 1869.

20 Richard S. Tompson, The Charity Commission and the Age of Reform (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), chapter 9 [re-check this???


22 Bernard Vigod, “Ideology or Institutions: The Public Charities Controversy of 1921,”
??? check title, vol #, pages Histoire sociale / Social History xx (1978),xxx; Valverde, 44–8;
Bremner 95-6

23 Mark D. McGarvie, “The Dartmouth College Case and the Legal Design of Civil

24 Oelbaum, 68–9. Oelbaum’s account begins in 1939, but the community organization
division he describes existed before the war: see MG 28 I 10, vols. 157–62

25 Bremner, 133; David G. Duff, “Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax:
Evaluating the Canadian Credit,” in Phillips, Chapman, and Stevens, 408–9; for the role of the
welfare federations in campaigning for that exemption, see NSARM, HCC executive committee
minutes, 18 June 1930

26 Christie, passim; Margaret Jane Hillyard Little, ‘No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit’:
The Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 192 –1997, passim; Struthers, Limits of
Affluence, chapter 1; Ruth Roach Pierson, “Gender and the Unemployment Insurance Debates in

27 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995). [??I should put in the footnote here an
example of something she explains well and one point of limitation.]
28 Bremner, 140.

29 Lubove, 172-3, 180, and chapter seven.

30 Trattner, 222

31 Struthers, *Limits of Affluence*, 21, 101–4; Speisman, chapter ???

32 Irving and Daenzer, 283


34 For such a broad interpretive trend, the number of examples is vast. A particularly expert and telling recent example that shows the merits of the approach is Margaret McCallum, “Corporate Welfarism in Canada, 1919–1939,” Canadian Historical Review 31, 1 (1990), 46–79.

35 See chapter 4 and conclusion

36 In Canada, this influence is apparent in William Gairdner, *The Attack on the Family* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1992), in which he approvingly quotes (80–1) a leading Reagan-ite commentator Charles Murray. For an American critique of this notional separation of public and private, see Salamon, 1–5, chapter 2


38 In this general theoretical statement, I draw on a messy and nearly untraceable interaction in my reflections on two decades of empirical research and heterogenous reading in social, political, ethical, epistemological, and literary theory. Without blaming any single writer in particular for the conclusions I have drawn about how state and society interact, I would single out the following as methodological influences: Quentin Skinner, “Language and social change,” in *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics*, Polity Press 1988), 199-32; Mariana Valverde, *Age of Light, Soap, and Water* (chapter 2); Rorty on redescription…. Where? In *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*?; *Dollimore, Sexual Dissidence*; *Joan W Scott, Gender as a Useful Category*; *Latour, Pandora’s Hope* (circulating knowledges, chapter 2); *Jeffrey C. Alexander, article in New Social Theory Reader or his book The Micro-Macro link; Michele Barret, Politics of Truth; Salamon on public and private charity.

39 In *Limits of Affluence*, Struthers carefully delineates six different analytical perspectives from which welfare history has been written. Like him, however, I find myself combining elements: most centrally, I expect, this book is an example of the new institutionalist approach. But the social context within which the world of leaders and politicians operated, in my view, is best described in terms developed by neo-marxist and feminist scholars, and my emphasis on democratization owes something to the social democratic perspective. I hope, also, that the Foucauldians’ view of modes of government offers something of the same kind of strengths as the older political culture literature, even if its limitations are also similar.
I owe particular debts either from conversation with or for the work of (for Vancouver) Robert A.J. MacDonald, Robert Campbell, Mark Leier, Todd McCullum, and Andrew Parnaby; (for Ottawa) John H. Taylor, Jeff Keshen and Nicole St. Onge, and Robert Choquette; and (for Halifax) Judith Fingard, David Sutherland, Janet Guildford, and Suzanne Morton.

My understanding of this methodology is based generally in reading the work of its practitioners, including, for example, Anne McClintock (see *Imperial Leather*...). However, descriptions of the methodology’s conceptual underpinnings may be found in Mary Poovey, *Uneven Developments: the ideological work of gender in Victorian England*. Stanley Fish, *Interpretive Communities*; ED Hirsch Jr, *Aims of Interpretation* [complete citations...???

My thanks to Jessica Squires, whose interest in the ideological work of consensus building on taxation questions in the Rowell-Sirois commission helped me develop my earlier thinking on this point. Her argument on the Rowell-Sirois’s work of fabricating apparent consensus is presented in [title of MA thesis], (M.A., History, Dalhousie University, 2003)

“Citizenship of contribution” is Geoffrey Finlayson’s phrase.

As Jane Lewis has observed of Victorian voluntary organizations, they should be seen, not as alternatives to the state, but “as part of the way in which political leaders conceptualised the state.” *The Voluntary Sector, the State, and Social Work in Britain*. (London: Edward Elgar, 1995), 8; see also Jean-Marie Fecteau, “Etat et associationisme...” in Allan Greer and Ian Radforth, eds. Colonial Leviathan... Complete title (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,)

See chapters 3 and 6, and my “Class and community in Canadian Welfare Work, 1935-1965”

A recent example: Newspaper columnist Margaret Wente, in arguing for the superiority of Toronto mayoral candidate John Tory, gave as one of her reasons that “He had also raised a record amount of money for the city’s social services when he was chairman of the United Way, even after 9 / 11 devastated everybody’s fundraising plans.” “The man who should be mayor,” *Globe and Mail*, 9 September 2003, A17.


UWOC, campaign committee minutes, 14 April 1961

BC copies, other cards and copies

“United Appeal a Sham,” newspaper clipping, CVA, Add mss 849,vol. 1 file 14

Martin Luther King and the Black Power conflict in the US: citation from Sue Campbell plus general history; Spirit of the Sixties


Again, more general literature on the comm org crit of social work and professionalism

copies file

Jackson history
58 Jeffrey C. Alexander article on binaries