Working Paper # 9

Social Investment State/Civil Society Interactionism: New Forms of Governance in Britain

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Paper prepared for the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association Meeting, St. John’s, Newfoundland, September 26–28, 2003

The project FOSTERING SOCIAL COHESION: A COMPARISON OF NEW POLICY STRATEGIES has the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). For other papers in the project see http://www.cccq.umontreal.ca/Engender%20la%20cohesion_FR.html
This paper examines how New Labour’s social investment state policies have been debated and disputed, realized and resisted through the interactions of a range of political actors in Britain. The term social investment state was coined by Anthony Giddens and refers to a state form that is neither purely neo-liberal nor is it social democratic and thus represents more of a “third way” amalgam (Giddens 1998). The social investment state calls for investment to counterbalance the social ills wreaked by rampant neo-liberalism. Nonetheless, as Pete Alcock points out this often represents “redistribution by stealth” (Alcock, 2000:255) because explicitly social democratic objectives remain “politically unmentionable” (Piachaud and Sutherland, 2001:113) for New Labour in the post-Thatcher era (see Driver and Martell 2003). At the same time, the social investment state can not be depicted as being traditionally welfarist in its orientation. The social investment state spends, but selectively and in targeted ways. Expenditures take place in areas with perceived dividends, such as in health or education. Notably, the social investment state has initiated a plethora of social policies that are mostly child or youth-centred and activation-oriented, from new deals for youth, trust funds for children and tax credits for working families to child care initiatives and progress made on parental leaves (Bashevkin 2002; Dobrowolsky 2002b; Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin 2002; Lister 2003). These are considered good investments in the future. Welfare is geared towards “preventive rather than ameliorative” ends (Powell 1999:16) and accountability and performance are prioritized. The social investment state works at public-private associations and has a penchant for “partnerships” of various kinds. Its aim is to combat social exclusion and promote prosperity. Overall, the social investment state “steers” more than “rows,” (Daly 2003:12) and “enables” rather than commands (Bullen, Kenway and Hall 2000:441).

Rather than delineate the details and scope of social investment state policies (see Dobrowolsky 2002b), the objective of this paper is to explore why they have come about and how they have been carried out. This necessitates a review and reconsideration of the role played by various political forces. While the latter tends to be circumscribed in leading institutional and structuralist accounts that focus on selective political interests, the aim here is to broaden the purview of the political to encompass not only traditional political players, but an array of interests and identities in civil society. The intent is to query and to determine who is “in” and who is “out” when it comes to the design and delivery of social investment state policies, and assess the implications for governance.

The paper consists of four parts. Part I provides some brief theoretical grounding for the approach taken in this study. Then, Part II moves to more conventional considerations with an examination of the influence of central state actors. At the top of the heap we find New Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. As we shall see, both are pivotal players when it comes to the consolidation of the social investment state. Here, continuities and changes in their styles of governance, as compared to their Conservative/neo-liberal and Labour/ social democratic,
predecessors will be mapped out to highlight their impact on the social investment state. In Part III the political sights/sites are broadened with an examination of assorted civil society associations,2 from think tanks and voluntary sector spokespersons, to political advocacy groups and social movements. It will become evident that some have seized and even shaped social investment state discourses of “political modernization” and “partnership”, while others have challenged and contested them. These state-civil society relationships are problematized as we consider both the opportunities and constraints at stake. The main objective, however, is to show how this complex, political interactionism has helped to influence the form of, and directions taken by, the social investment state.

This paper engages with this year’s APPSA conference themes of optimism and pessimism in several respects. For example, in terms of the level of analysis, the paper optimistically strives to provide a more robust (albeit more complicated) but hopefully more complete political picture, where agency of various kinds is foregrounded. That is, I take the view that the social investment state is better understood and its priorities explained as a result of state-civil society interactionism. Secondly, the subject matter of the paper optimistically suggests that opportunities can arise with the social investment state, given the new and/or different actors, discourses and institutions involved, along with the destabilization of traditional socio-political coalitions. Granted, one can, and I do, more pessimistically point to the concomitant and somewhat paradoxical centralization and “control freakery” of Tony Blair’s increasingly presidentialized Prime Minister’s office. Realistically, however, an assessment of why social investment state policies arise and how they unfold depends on: i), the nature of the new political allies and alliances; ii) the types of organizations at play; iii) and the policies in question. This also helps us to better understand which actors are truly included and which ones remain partially or fully excluded. In the final analysis, and to end on a more optimistic note, Part IV emphasizes that the policies and patterns of the social investment state are neither inevitable nor are they irreversible given these increasingly complex socio-political interactions.

**Part I: Theoretical Underpinnings**

In leading welfare state studies (save for most feminist welfare state analyses), the usual political suspects abound. Typically, conventional power brokers including government and political party leaders, bureaucrats, and heads of longstanding interest based associations are featured (Korpi 1989; Pierson 1994, 1998; Esping-Andersen, 1996, 2000; Myles and Pierson 1997, 2001). For example, feminist critics of Gosta Esping-Andersen have noted that his conceptualization: “limits the significant political actors and organizations to those with a base in the labour market and focuses on mainstream political organizations.” (Cameron and Gonas 1999:52; O’Connor 1993). Moreover as Ann Porter and Wendy McKeen point out:

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2 Scholte defines civil society as “a political space, or arena, where voluntary associations seek to shape the rules (formal and informal) that govern…civil society associations bring together people who share concerns about… particular policy issue[s].” (2003:14).
Myles, Pierson and others tend to define political agency in fairly narrow terms, as politician-constituent relations or as the activities of those who have been successful in establishing the...governing welfare state [model...However, it is also important to have a sense of the strategies and political activities of the more marginal or non-hegemonic groups in their efforts to influence the welfare state agenda (2001:7)

This preoccupation with traditional political associations serves to marginalize the discourses and strategies of other actors. It also precludes the fact that broader ideas, interests and identities can be catalysts for moving issues onto the policy agenda and bringing about change. This is particularly unfortunate in times of transition, when once marginal groups may be offering policy ideas, or opposing policy directions, and they may even be complicitous in the production of a new governing policy framework.

In contrast, the present account foregrounds politics and agency, broadly conceived. Critical feminist welfare state literature and social movement theorizing (building on the political opportunity structure model) informs this analysis. Feminist scholars have sought to reconcile analytical extremes where on one hand, structures and institutions are all determining, and on the other, where through concerted action everything is possible (Jenson 1991; Lewis 1994; Evans and Wekerle 1997; Armstrong and Connelly 1999; Briskin 1999; Lister 1999; O’Connor, Orloff and Shaver 1999; Watson 2000; Adams and Padamsee 2001; Michel and Mahon 2002). Here Sophie Watson’s observation that various political interests and identities are “perpetually constructed in the process of interaction with specific institutions and sites, and within particular discourses which can be challenged and shifted strategically” (Watson 2000:72) is insightful. Not just sanctions, but subjects, strategies and signification require closer attention (Adams and Padamsee 2001:11; Dobrowolsky 2003). According to social movement scholars, such forms of inter-relation are at once symbolic, strategic and they are political (Koopmans and Statham 1999: 229, 247). In short, the perspective of this paper is “interactionist”\(^3\), for the contention is that such a premise allows for greater scope for new insights, creative thought and action.

To be clear, this is not to suggest that conventional political actors no longer matter, nor is the power that they wield underestimated. In fact, the next section provides a careful study of more conventional power/control dynamics. Rather, what is emphasized is that governance, “a collectivity’s steering, coordination, and control mechanisms” (Scholte 2002), involves much more than state actors and traditional political interests. Contemporary governance is multi-dimensional (Gamble 2002; Daly 2003). It involves both cooperation and conflict between and among conventional political actors and civil society associations, between multiple interests and identities.

\(^3\) Here I adopt/adapt Imig and Tarrow’s term used in relation to collective actors and European contention. They write: “Ours is neither a neofunctionalist, a neorealist, nor a constructivist perspective but an interactionist one: we believe that if a European polity emerges, it will not be as the result of the autonomous formation of European identities or of the diffusion of hegemonic concepts from above, but as a long-term outcome of conflict and cooperation between and among nonstate and public actors” (2001:4).
Granted, such state-civil society relations have their limitations and can involve both gains and losses. As will become apparent, the state’s participatory proclivities may be more apparent than real (Sheldrick 2002). Alternatively, the state’s interaction with civil society may be all too real and serve to legitimize the state, giving it more control, as well as lending credence to its pledges for greater transparency and accountability. Moreover, some may be encouraged to participate, whereas others may not. And, of course, certain civil society associations may choose not to cooperate. Vital social movements, in particular circumstances, would rather keep a critical distance from the formal channels of politics and express their dissent, thereby boosting their symbolic stature in civil society, but limiting their strategic leverage vis-à-vis the state. Consequently, state and civil society interactions, and even the institutional forms that develop based on their partnerships can both “depend upon each other” as well as potentially “undercut each other” (Offe 2000:93).

Given such complex interactions, it has become much harder to determine where policies originate and how they get set. As Andrew Gamble notes:

Lines of accountability and responsibility have become blurred, and many of the old levers of power no longer work in the way they used to, so that ways of shaping policy have become less obvious. In some respects governments have never been more intrusive, yet at the same time never so lacking in capacity actually to formulate and implement coherent policies (Gamble 2002:290).

Ultimately, much depends on the political opportunity structure, and in the case of Britain, this structure is in a period of transition. At the same time, however, such structures are not all-determining. Collective actors can take up and sometimes transform these opportunities, and in the process, often change themselves (Dobrowolsky 2000; 2002a; 2003; Dobrowolsky and Hart 2003). Overall, the point here is to underscore that, when it comes to the social investment state, it is not simply conventional political actors and institutions that matter, but broader political associations as well. Indeed, the argument made here is that it is in the various state-society interrelations that the contours and policy preferences of the social investment state become more distinctive and can be better understood.

**Part II: New Labour, Blair, Brown and Governance: Continuity and Change**

With New Labour’s rise to power, during its first term 1997-2001, and then with its re-election in 2001, we the social investment state take shape and then consolidate. In the run-up to the 1997 election, New Labour openly acknowledged the state’s institutional deficiencies and democratic deficits. As a result, the party campaigned not only on a programme of constitutional change and devolution, but also, on a platform of political modernization, more generally. In fact, it set out to construct and occupy a new politico-moral architecture. In the words of New Labour, the key was to fashion “ ‘A dynamic knowledge-based economy founded on individual empowerment and opportunity, where governments enable, not command, and the power of the market is harnessed to serve the public interest’ ” (as quoted in Bullen, Kenway and Hay 2000:441). Political
modernization also meant a more pluralistic “participatory” political thrust, and efforts to promote transparency and accountability. As will become apparent, Tony Blair, the new, New Labour leader, was not alone in this project, but he personified it and was one of the principle architects.

Blair endeavoured to create, in his words, “a ‘modernised social democracy’” (Blair quoted in Ludlam 2001:30). In fact he went so far as to say that the Labour had to “‘modernize or die’”(Driver and Martel 2002: 223). He believed that the survival of social democracy required mediation between economic and social justice demands (Blair 1996). To achieve this alchemy, discourses of equality transmuted into promoting social inclusion and combating social exclusion. Thus, once in office, one of the Blair government’s first innovations was the creation of the Social Exclusion Unit (plans were announced in August 1997 and the Unit was launched in December). In addition, Blair’s approach revolved around risk avoidance and the promotion of safe, good “bets” such as education to equip citizens for life and break poverty and welfare dependency. Blair resolved to provide people with “opportunities” to realize their potential. This focus on opportunity also resulted in a shift in responsibility. The state would no longer be a provider, but rather an enabler (Blair 2002). Blair championed individual rights and responsibilities, duties and obligations. All of this necessitated public participation in and beyond newly created institutional sites, as will be elaborated upon here and in Part III.

As Prime Minister, Blair displayed both continuities and changes with his Conservative and Labour predecessors. His approach was often more evolutionary than revolutionary. Nonetheless, Blair’s distinctive contributions lay in his enthusiasm for pragmatism and experimentation, his endorsement of cooperation and collaboration, and his calls for greater openness (Rouse and Smith 1999: 250-251). Blair’s project was certainly pragmatic. He would keep what worked under Conservative rule and change what did not, for his policy making was guided by the maxim “what matters is what works” (Lister 2001:67). However, as some commentators have noted, Blair’s third way was not all pragmatism and not just about what worked best, “because choices [had] to be made about competing values” (Driver and Martel 2002:87).

Blair explained that he was staying true to the basic principles of the Labour party, those of “justice and progress”; however, they would be “applied in a different way for the modern world- stressing education, skills, technology, design and invention, and the role for small business” (MacGregor 1988:264). Again, in his estimation, this would require “different attitudes and a different role for the state” but the aim would be “to extend educational opportunity to all young people” and this would form “the heart of modern radicalism” (MacGregor 1998:264). In actuality, Blair’s approach removed the safety net and brought in the trampoline. He wagered that with paid work and education, individuals, particularly young ones, could bounce their way out of poverty. For example, New Labour’s first and flagship “New Deal” moved young people from welfare into work; the Working Families Tax Credit was introduced in October 1999 to promote work and support for families with children. Investing in children became a top priority. Sure Start programs were established to deal with young, poor children and the Quality Protects initiative committed substantial funds over five years to improve services for
children leaving care. New institutions were established and funds allocated such as with the Children and Young Peoples Unit (in the first term) and later, the Child Trust Fund (in the second). At best, the plethora of social investment state policies promulgated by the Prime Minister can be characterized as imaginative and innovative, at worst, as done on the fly, lurching forward in uncoordinated ways.

As we shall see, many of these core projects were based on collaboration and cooperation with informal networks and communities, as well as more formal partnerships of various kinds. As Daly observes:

One of the few clear objectives of New Labour’s Third Way...is to shift the centre of gravity of governance away from the bureaucratic state and the private market towards civil society and its informal networks and communities…It is networks which are prioritised in New Labour parlance…government’s conception of its relationship with citizens, communities are all up for discussion as the weaknesses of mainstream liberal democratic institutions become ever more apparent. The meaning of democratic participation (in the words of New Labour ‘democratic renewal’) and the nature of citizenship are therefore part of governance’s sub-text (Daly 2003:120-121).

At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, Blair wanted to be in control. Not only did he work to keep himself “on message,” but he also ensured that party members towed the party line, before, during and well after the 1997 election. Blair proceeded to tighten the Prime Ministerial reins which had been loosened by his Conservative predecessor, John Major. The New Labour Prime Minister clearly preferred the iron grip of Margaret Thatcher. Like Thatcher, Blair has been accused of authoritarianism, and is frequently depicted as somewhat of a “control freak” (Driver and Martel 2002: 54, 56). This command and control style was evident both in relation to the Labour party and to the British parliament (Seyd and Whiteley 2001: 86).

As some have despaired, Blair’s efforts at modernization have often come at the expense of the Labour party (Panitch and Leys 2001). First came Blair’s 1995 decision to revamp the party by rewriting Clause IV (the constitutional clause which committed Labour to socialist ideals). Then his populist participatory appeals to the people increasingly appeared to circumvent traditional Labour party democracy and to consolidate top-down leadership (Mair 2000). Bit by bit, Blair transformed the party “into a brokerage party skilled at the art of voter accommodation” (Sheldrick 2002: 134).

To illustrate, a Labour document was published in January 1997 for discussion purposes. It was aimed not only at getting the party elected, but when in power, to ensure that relationships between the incoming Labour government, the cabinet, parliamentary party, and the party executive (NEC) and membership, were working well. The document was aptly entitled: *Labour Into Power: A Framework for Partnership*. It called for restructuring the party, setting up local policy for that would feed into eight new policy commissions. This would serve to diminish the policy-making role of the conventional, annual Labour party conference. The latter, invariably a volatile event, could potentially make the party look divided and give the impression that the leader was, if not weak,
insufficiently in control of the party. Blair opted for the more easily orchestrated policy forum with a number of commissions that would contribute a manageable source of ideas and support for his leadership. As Seyd and Whiteley note, “the sometimes robustious and unpredictable, public annual conference is replaced by the private, more discursive and reflective policy forum” (2001:80). In theory, the idea was to open up policy discussions and to make them more productive. In practice, the dialogue tended to be monopolized by a “well resourced ministerial team”, or by facilitators who would translate small group discussions “in which middle-class professionals [felt] at ease and [were] likely to predominate” (Seyd and Whiteley 2001: 81, 82).

Other party controls were also put in place. For instance, members of the NEC and party members would become subject to codes of discipline and sanction, mandating that they, for instance, clear requests for media interviews with the party’s press office. Butler and Kavanagh maintain that Labour “set new standards in agenda-setting, rapid rebuttal, [and] disciplined adherence to a “message’’” (2002:21).

When it came to parliament, Blair not only tightened party discipline, but also ensured that the scope and significance of the Prime Ministerial role and his Prime Minister’s Office grew. The New Labour Prime Minister clearly saw himself as actively involved in the development of policy. In practice, this meant beefing up his personal policy advisors, relying less on the mechanisms of parliament, and having less call for the civil service. Under Blair, the number of political appointees nearly doubled and more direct lines of communication were set up between these political appointments, Number 10 Downing Street, and the departments (Richards and Smith 2001:151). Blair even evaded his own cabinet, preferring to work one on one with key cabinet ministers, or with his advisors. Accountability and representation were issues. For instance, in relation to the latter, despite having a record 101 Labour women in Parliament after the 1997 election, Blair’s cabinet contained few women and his inner circle of elite advisors was predominantly comprised of bright, white males.4

In relation to the former, the Prime Minister also depended more on task forces, rather than cabinet committees, to deal with specific issues. The former were not even chaired by cabinet ministers. Alternatively, “a large number of outsiders” took on these roles so that “of the 23 taskforces only 4 [were] chaired by ministers “(Richards and Smith 2001:153). These bodies also typify Blair’s “participatory” approach to policy making, and show that he was less apt to turn to the civil service for advice. Whereas these taskforces were portrayed as being more open and pluralistic, they again raised questions of accountability.

Another Blairism, and one of the Prime Minister’s key objectives was to achieve “joined-up government” (Mulgan 1998). The view that “joined-up problems need joined-up

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4 Anna Coote writes: “they are young, male, white graduates who live and breathe and eat and dream in the same small biosphere. They control entry and recruit those whom they trust, who speak their language, share their values and play to their rules. The Policy Unit at 10 Downing Street has been described as a ‘football team’ and that is not just a metaphor. A few women are allowed in if they can play the game…but they are not leading players” (2001:131).
solutions” and the notion that there was a real need for “holistic governance” are contained in Blair’s White Paper, _Modernising Government_ (Rhodes 2002:116). These concepts also exemplify the contradictory pushes and pulls of his efforts at collaboration/openness versus centralized control. Blair built up the resources of Number 10, hired more staff, established new units, and strengthened the Prime Minister’s office all in the name of joined up government. This was billed as a more coordinated approach to multi-level governance. But here too critics have pointed out that while these actions addressed the lack of synchronization and disproportionate independence of a more departmentalized administrative style, it also served to promote even greater centralization.

It is, however, important to note that Blair’s joined-up government provided a fresh source of policy ideas not only through his new advisors (notably, often with extensive civil society experience), but also via the creation of a whole host of novel units. For example, not only the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU) but the Strategic Communications Unit and the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit were established in Blair’s first twelve months in office. Other units followed such as the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) in 1998, and then, of course, the Children and Young Person’s Unit (CYPU) created in November of 2000. Again, innovation, experimentaion and collaboration were encouraged. Many of these units were meant to build partnerships. As will be discussed below, from the SEU to the PIU and CYPU, an expressed objective was to involve the voluntary and third sector in governance.

Still, there is no denying that more Blairite political appointees and a greater number of strong policy units also provided a means of imposing control on government. Consequently, Blair’s agenda worked at cross purposes, serving to centralize and consolidate the Prime Minister’s power, but also attempting to modernize, innovate and collaborate. For example, in stark contrast to the 1970’s, when Labour Prime Ministers “had to battle with the NEC to exclude left-wing ideas from the manifesto,” in the run up to the 2001 election, Blair was able to rely on a few trusted insiders with fewer hassles (Butler and Kavanagh 2002:28). The responsibility for drafting Labour’s 2001 election manifesto lay primarily with David Miliband, the head of the Number 10 Policy Unit, and Ed Richards, another Policy Unit member.5

And yet, Blair’s modernization project was premised on cooperation, openness, and more public participation. This meant that, when in power, the Prime Minister was compelled to engage in various forms of political experimentation that included efforts at broader consultation. Blair not only “sought new ways to communicate directly to the voters” (Butler and Kavanagh 2002:27), but he reached out to multiple communities. The Prime Minister toyed with deliberative fora to foster state-citizens participation with a view to not just multi-level governance but “co-governance”. And thus, Newman et al, describe how: “public service agencies and local state actors mediate new ways of governing as they enact government policies, but also how citizens, as individuals and groups, engage

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5 Butler and Kavanagh describe the closely knit nature of the group planning the 2001 election campaign and pinpoint the pivotal nature of what was dubbed the Group of 6 (2002:36).
Blair also appealed to new (for the Labour party) associations to broaden his electoral support. Most notably, and in contrast to Old Labour, business was one of these constituencies (more on this below). However, unlike under Thatcher, and more akin to some of John Major’s efforts, Blair expanded stakeholder debates. Blair, like Major, started by giving voice to various “stakeholders”. But then Blair went further than the Conservatives, (Daly 2003:121) by actively pursuing partnerships on a whole host of levels.\(^6\) This included forging relationships with and between the following: “central government, the new assemblies, local government, business, the ‘third sector’ or voluntary organizations, academic research and education, and so forth” (Fairclough 2000:124). As one of Blair’s gurus, Anthony Giddens, maintains, the social investment state operates on the basis of co-operation and partnership with agencies in civil society (Giddens 1998:69). In contradistinction to earlier Labour and Conservative governments, then, this was not just about the state, or just about the market, nor was it solely about the family, or the community. Rather, it was about developing better relationships between all four. Blair’s approach required collaboration and partnerships that were then built into New Labour’s broader strategic policy framework.

Before pursuing this matter at more length, as it will be addressed and analyzed in Part III, the contradictory nature of New Labour’s governing style will be reinforced with an examination of the increasingly important role played by Blair’s Chancellor. Gordon Brown also helps to produce and perpetuate the foregoing social investment state tendencies.

**Gordon Brown, the Treasury and the Social Investment State**

For Blair, one on one rapport with ministers was/is important, but arguably no relationship is more significant than the one between the Prime Minister and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown. Both men had figured prominently in former Labour leader John Smith’s modernization team, and both had leadership aspirations. The two were identified as Labour’s shining stars (even among Conservatives (Driver and Martell 2002:57)) and it was Brown not Blair who was touted as the next leader. Upon Smith’s untimely death, however, the more moderate and media savvy Blair, who had gained a more Clintonesque reputation (supplemented by a tough-on-crime demeanour) won out. Nevertheless, as Chancellor, Brown would certainly leave his mark.

Brown was, like Blair, a New Labour disciple who proselytized the “modernizing” policy agenda. For both, opportunity “provides the framework for Labour’s approach in politics” (Oppenheim 1998:145). The Chancellor’s commitment to equality of

\(^6\) Partnerships became Blair’s preferred discourse over “stakeholders” because the latter was considered too tainted with leftist associations. Thus, Blair promulgated the discourses of partnerships, social inclusion and community (Driver and Martel 2002:68).
opportunity derives from the 1994 Commission on Social Justice (CSJ), and so, for Brown, the Labour government’s new objective “must be even more ambitious than the one Beveridge set us; not only to tackle disadvantage but to promote opportunity” (Brown 2001: iii). Brown “argues for a maximalist version of equality of opportunity which is ‘recurrent, lifelong and comprehensive’” (Oppenheim 1998:145).

In some ways, the Chancellor was considered to be more broad-minded than the Prime Minister. Still, the former’s Scottish Presbyterian values became evident with Brown’s penchant for paid work over welfare. As one commentator has suggested, “[t]he principles on which Brown’s decisions rest are to encourage work, savings and fairness” (MacGregor 1998:253). The Chancellor’s policy preferences were underpinned by the following priorities: “stability; investment; education; reform of the welfare state; and a constructive engagement with Europe” (MacGregor 1998:254).

Brown was acutely conscious of shaking Labour’s tax and spend image, and building a profile of being a credible and cautious money manager (Thomas 2001:65). Thus, he kept to his promise of not exceeding Conservative spending limits for the first two years in office. Moreover, given that one of his first acts was to transfer the setting of the interest rate to the Bank of England from the Treasury (Thomas 2001:65), Brown was considered a “Labour chancellor the City could trust: (Driver and Martel 2002:28).

While the role of Treasury has always been crucial, under Brown, its scope significantly widened. Brown did not believe that the state should take a back seat. Rather it should drive ahead with strategies for tackling exclusion by creating education and employment-based as well as economic opportunities. The Treasury would serve as the engine. Consequently, the Treasury’s role in policy development grew. Brown, like Blair, was a key policy shaper. For example, Brown first used the term New Deal in 1992 and his economic ideas then went how to form the nucleus of subsequent New Labour manifesto pledges (MacGregor 1998:259). Once in office, we have seen a multitude of “new deal” policies come into effect, beginning with the aforementioned New Deal for Young People.

Under Brown, the Treasury took an active interest in social policies, which were increasingly wedded to economic strategies. For instance, services typically under the rubric of what used to be the Department for Social Security (DSS) (now called the Department of Work and Pensions), were annexed by the Treasury as tax credits over benefits became the preferred mode of redistribution. As Sylvia Bashevkin suggests, social policy became “taxified” (Bashevkin 2003:136). In addition, not only were the various “New Deals” Brown’s baby, but programmes like Sure Start and structures such as the CYPU were Treasury initiatives.

No doubt, Brown was concerned with stability and ensuring economic growth in the future and many of his work-dependent, tax based, policy directives contained more than

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7 Former Labour leader John Smith pushed for the CSJ. In hindsight it certainly contains many New Labour themes, including a notion of “investors Britain.” However, after John Smith’s death this document was considered more “Old Labour” as Tony Blair’s version of New Labour took off (see Lister 2003:5).
a few neo-liberal elements. Nevertheless, the Chancellor remained interested in a measure of social democratic redistribution. His approach has been dubbed “‘a new supply-side agenda for the left’” (Lister 2003:5). Brown’s personal motto was “prudence with a purpose”. This meant exercising monetary and fiscal prudence, but then purposively spending the surplus on “collective public services” (Driver and Martel 2002: 61). Again, this meant spending, in Brown’s terms, “investment” would occur in the areas of education, child care and health, and targeted redistribution would take place, but it was oriented towards the working poor, with children.

In practice, as Gamble and Kelly point out, while “the word ‘redistribution” at least officially, rarely figures in New Labour rhetoric, mainly because of its taxation implications…[still] redistribution remains an important objective…and is reflected in Brown’s budgets” (2001:182). From the start, Brown worked on increasing spending for education and health, as well as to finance welfare to work. Given good economic times, through “stealth taxes” (e.g., consumption taxes) and a one time only windfall tax on newly privatized utilities, the Treasury had a surplus to draw upon. In July of 1998, Brown announced a 57 billion pound increase in expenditures (Gamble and Kelly 2001:175). By July of 2000, Brown pledged an extra 63 billion pound on public services over the next three years (Butler and Kavanagh 2002:25). Then, when Labour was safely in its second term in office, Brown’s 2002 budget contained even more substantial increases in public spending, rising from 39.8% in 2002-2003 to 41.8% in 2005-2006” (Driver and Martell 2002:227).

Hence, while Brown’s particular brand of redistribution was initially kept under wraps (Alcock 2000:255), it would become much more apparent (Driver and Martell 2002:39). Still, as Powell notes, in Brown’s books, there is still “bad” spending and “good spending”. Spending on unemployed people on benefit is bad, while investment in education and health and on the child benefit is good (Powell 1999:21). Therefore, increasing the income of those at the bottom of the labour market and to families with children were definitely priorities. Indeed, it was children who became a focal point for Brown’s largesse (Dobrowolsky 2002b). In a series of speeches, the Chancellor began to highlight the problem of child poverty, even going so far as to describe child poverty as “a scar on Britain’s soul” (Brown 1999:8). When presenting his 2002 budget, Brown announced that this would be “one of the biggest single investments in children and families since the welfare state was formed in the 1940’s” (Brown cited in Lister 2003:8). Given the Chancellor’s leverage over social policy, when he announced this commitment to ending child poverty, various line departments could see the utility in focusing on the child.

In sum, both Blair and Brown have had immense influence on the form and policies of the social investment state. However, in part due to their modernization commitments, their concern with social exclusion, and pledges regarding participation and partnerships, they are not alone in the shaping of policy. As a result, contemporary governance is much messier and policy communities and influences are much more diverse than in the past. Let us now examine the role played by a wider array of networks and political forces. It is
here that the state-civil society “interactionism” in relation to the social investment state, an implicit theme thus far, becomes much more explicit.

**Part III: Participation and Partnerships: Civil Society Inclusion/Exclusion**

As Ruth Lister suggests, “Partnership, while not a novel idea, is, in its multifarious guises and new suits of clothing, the linchpin of New Labour’s modernising governance agenda” (2003:3). Partnerships were first promoted by the Conservatives in the post-war period, and then by the New Right as part of a strategy of welfare state retrenchment. But New Labour realized that “these concepts can also be seen as ways of re-empowering citizens involving them in forming innovative and appropriate solutions to social exclusion.” (Annesley 2001:214). It is the latter focus that makes New Labour’s social investment state stand apart from the neo-liberal state. Granted, New Labour’s discourses of participation, partnership and inclusion may be written off by some as mere rhetoric, as more style and soundbite than substance. However, as Driver and Martell indicate, when you scratch beneath surface of the “soundbites and ever more careful packaging [there] is something substantial” (2002:16). All this may boil down to New Labour’s kinder gentler version of the kind of off-loading inspired and initiated by the Thatcher/Major Conservatives. While this is definitely a danger, this form of governance nonetheless creates opportunities (as well as constraints) and moves beyond some of the limitations of the neo-liberal state.

As noted above, Prime Minister Blair has been more open to experimentation via new forms of public participation and consultation. Again, these efforts obviously display contradictory features. Yet, as social movement scholars remind us, expanding political opportunities, even constrained ones, can nonetheless spur collective action (McAdam et al, 1996:7). What follows is that a range of civil society actors has had influence with respect to the social investment state and its policy priorities. But, who is helping to mould, and taking advantage of these opportunities, exactly?

In general, more critical and radical social movements and collective identity-based groups are not favoured. Rather, Blair’s “civil society actors”, those considered the prime candidates for “partnership” include the following: child-focused researchers and centre-left think tanks; the traditional private sector; voluntary/charitable organizations, especially children’s associations; families and individuals.

**Who is In:** business, local partners, charitable/voluntary groups focused on children’s interests, citizens, families

Upon closer examination, Tony Blair’s social investment state engages with and is informed by particular segments of civil society such as key research institutions and think tanks, some businesses, local authorities, and charitable groups, particularly those focused on children’s interests, as well as citizens and families. Actors and associations once external to the state are called upon to come up with fresh policy ideas, and in some cases are asked to become part of the state. Thus, for example, the government’s new Centre for Management and Policy Studies incorporates “the existing Civil Service
College with the aim of introducing more outside influences on policy thinking” (Richards and Smith 2001:150).

Similarly, New Labour has turned to public intellectuals and centre-left think tanks for new policy thinking. To illustrate, while education and increasingly social exclusion were stated policies for Labour in 1997, soon the emphasis shifted to children. Around the same time the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) was established at the London School of Economics and numerous workshops were organized between CASE researchers and policy makers. It was not long before research linking child poverty and social exclusion was released with titles such as: *Intergenerational and Life-Course Transmission of Social Exclusion: Influences of Childhood Poverty*..., and *Childhood Poverty, Early Motherhood and Adult Social Exclusion* (Hobcraft 1998; Hobcraft and Kiernan 1999). The Joseph Roundtree Foundation-funded studies are illustrative as well. In the early 1990’s it brought together policy makers, practitioners and academic specialist on the topic of the family. By 1999, its studies were specifically geared towards children in poverty, assessing how, through employability efforts, putting money towards children would be a social investment. In one, the following conclusion was drawn: “any measures that successfully address child poverty, especially by giving more households’ access to jobs, are likely to have wide-ranging effects in the years ahead that go beyond the improvement of the immediate welfare of poor children” (Gregg, Harkness, Machin 1999). The accumulated data also made apparent that the “effectiveness of education reforms could be undermined by unacceptably high levels of child poverty and that impoverished benefits claimants are not the best recruits for ‘welfare to work’” (cited in Lister 1998:5). Hence, children were a good investment in numerous respects, and New Labour’s social investment state would run with these findings.

In addition, according to Gamble, key think tanks began working “to forge a new consensus on the way ahead” in terms of social and economic policy. They included: “the Adam Smith Institute’s Omega project on the reform on the welfare state and public services; the [Institute for Research on Public Policy] IPPR’s Social Justice Commission which laid the foundations for Labour’s new ideas on welfare redistribution; the Fabian Society’s Commission on Tax and Citizenship, and the IPPR’s Commission on Private/Public Partnerships” (Gamble 2000:307). The latter was instrumental in selling these partnerships in “Third way speak” as an alternative to old left, public sector monopoly and new right private provisions (Driver and Martel 2002:45). From 1997 to 2001, contracts were signed for 150 PPP projects that included schools (520), hospitals (35), and prisons (4) (Toynbee and Walker 2001:105). IPPR also planted and cultivated seeds in relation to the child. Work on families and children began in the early 1990’s and a decade later, New Labour picked up on IPPR’s recommendations with the establishment of the Children’s Trust Fund (Harker, Coote interviews 2001). It is not surprising then, that Will Paxton of IPPR crowed: “Implementing the Child Trust Fund will ensure that all Britain’s babies have an endowment and a stake in the wealth of the country. Social mobility has actually declined in recent years in the UK and innovative policies, like the baby bond, will be needed to complement existing provision.” (Collinson 2002). Tony Blair has acknowledged that the Child Trust Fund “was worked up in close collaboration with think tanks on the centre-left, with the support of the IPPR
and the Fabian Society, children’s charities and financial service organizations. Ideas were shared, the practicalities carefully considered and refined (Blair 2003).

Other think tanks of note are Demos, a favourite of Blair, and the John Smith Institute “close to Gordon Brown” (Butler and Kavanagh 2002:28). The fact that the former has been particularly influential is somewhat ironic given that Martin Jacques, the former editor Marxism Today established Demos, together with Geoff Mulgan (Fairclough 2000:123). Nonetheless, because Demos has been predisposed to futuristic models and calls to break with past, it fit well with Labour’s modernization agenda. Not surprisingly then, Mulgan went on to become the director of the government’s Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU). The PIU not only works closely with Number 10, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury to generate new ideas, but its mandate calls for “extensive consultation.” The PIU solicits “expressions of interest from high caliber individuals with substantial experience in the pubic, private who could join a team working on strategic solutions at the heart of government, either on secondment or on a fixed term contract” (http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/innovation/about/shtml).

Here, and elsewhere, the interchange between civil society actors and the state becomes apparent. Some civil servants as well as some of Blair’s key policy advisors have been lured from think tanks or from the voluntary sector. They often move around, from civil society into the state and back again. For instance Matthew Taylor, Head of Policy returned to IPPR before the 2001 election as he “calculated that such a position would give him more opportunity to proselytise on behalf of progressive politics than one in Millbank or even in Number 10” (Butler and Kavanagh 2002: 30).

Beyond the think tanks, and in direct contrast to Old Labour, businesses are also partners. As Kavanagh describes:

Business was actively courted: business leaders were recruited to give advice on policy and join project teams, corporations received addresses by Blair and Brown and they were successfully solicited for funds. Key figures such as Lords Sainsbury, Haskins, Simon and (Gus) MacDonald held offices in the new government. This was a signal that the trade unions no long had a special relationship with the party. (in Politics UK, 247).

However, unlike the Conservatives, local level partnerships with charitable and voluntary associations are also promulgated, reflecting Tony’ Blair’s emphasis on the community. Thus, we see the increasing “interpenetration of public authorities and voluntary and community associations...[and a ] high level of contact between the two sectors.” (Maloney, Smith, and Stoker 2000:817). This is particularly visible in relation to associations that deal with children.

Organizations with children as their raison d’être have had a multi-faceted impact from providing research and services to putting pressure on the state. In many cases, these roles are combined. For example, Britain’s National Children’s Bureau (NCB) has a well-established research department that carries out consultancy work and policy evaluation studies. It offers “consultancy evaluation and training to local authorities and other
organizations working to develop their services for children and young people” (http://www.ncb.org.uk). Furthermore, the NCB provides regular advice and briefings to the All Parliamentary Group on Children, a cross party group of approximately 140 MPs and Peers that meets regularly to discuss children related issues.

There are other notable children’s service providers that are also involved in research as well as advocacy. For example, Barnardo’s published a key study in the early 1990’s entitled *Children Come First*, and by the late 1990’s it found itself in partnership with New Labour. Numerous other children’s organizations such as Save the Children, National Children’s Home (NCH), National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty Against children (NSPCC) among others have also been enlisted by New Labour (Toynbee and Walker 2001: 16). Some of these groups go back a long way (NCH was founded in 1869 and NSPCC in 1889), but they are joining forces with newer groups like the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) to advocate for children. This is evident in the jointly published CPAG, Barnardos and NSPCC booklet, *Our Children: Their future, A Manifesto*.

Since the 1997 New Labour win, representatives from a number of these groups have commented on the warmer relationships between themselves and the government as compared to the chillier climate under the Conservative administration (interviews). Even Tony Blair’s spouse, the solicitor Cherie Booth, epitomized the nature of the new relationship becoming president of Barnardos. Relations have to be more cordial, given how heavily the Labour government relies on the voluntary sector to develop and administer its new projects. New Deals, Sure Start, and Children’s Fund programmes are run by voluntary organizations and local groups. When the Department for Education and Skills designated June 2002 as the first National Childcare Month, it was to be organized by Daycare Trust, Kids’ Clubs Network, National Childminding Association, National Day Nurseries Associations and Pre-School Learning alliance (http://ww.nationalchilcaremoth.ca).

CPAG would be considered one of the more radical advocacy groups and because of this, in the 1980’s CPAG and other associations with more of a social movement orientation were excluded from the policy process (Sheldrick 2000: 113-115). Labour in power signaled a change. As Fimister writes, “CPAG was not naïve enough to expect, in 1997, the advent of an era of calm seas and plain sailing. Nor were we cynical enough to expect nothing to be different. We considered that our role was to press on with our arguments, to credit where credit was due and to criticise when necessary” (2001:2). Keeping with this role, CPAG publicized the fact that child poverty increased by 100, 000 in the government’s first two years in office (Barnes 2000:1). And yet, CPAG was still praised by the Blair government. In a May 2001 speech, Gordon Brown began by paying tribute to CPAG’s work “that every day shines a spotlight on the needs and potential of our country’s children (http://ww.labour.or.uk). What is more, the Chancellor made his pledge to eradicate child poverty at a CPAG conference. Partnerships and children are central to New Labour’s project, and thus the government is willing to take some flack from certain civil society associations in the process. Gordon Brown sums this up:
A partnership between Government and the voluntary, community and faith sectors is the best way to tackle poverty and support families… Some of the most innovative projects of recent years have partnership with community organization at their heart. From a large Sure Start programme run by a children’s charity to a parent and toddler group in a local church, families not only benefit from excellent services but also have the chance to feel party of a wider community (Brown 2001:iii)

Certainly, there are tensions particularly given the contradictory styles outlined in Part II. As Driver and Martell caution: “Local partnerships take time to develop and Labour has relied more on dirigism to get things done- or not. ‘Command and control’ policy making can inhibit local partnerships” (2002:49). Again, Blair wants to modernize and devolve but does not want to give up control, and, somewhat like Thatcher, does not fully trust local authorities and civil society actors. Yet Labour’s rhetoric of getting closer to the people has spawned various consultative initiatives. While Major set these wheels into motion, the foregoing suggests that New Labour has taken a somewhat different route, which, in part, has been cleared by a wider range of actors. Still there are notable voices missing, especially those who are not singing the praises of New Labour, or its social investment state.

Who is out: leftist/unions and identity-based social movements

When Tony Blair waxes eloquent about civil society and civic participation, he does not necessarily have in mind social movement activism. As Driver and Martell observe, “To the disappointment of many environmentalists, feminists and others, there is little in Blair’s politics that is a direct response to contemporary radical social movements.” (2002:91). Here two movements effectively illustrate this point: the left/trade union movement and the women’s movement.

For a start, New Labour’s partnership could never be confused with a European social partnership model. If British trade unions had hoped to forge a more European partnership, with Labour’s rise to power, then they have been sorely disappointed. The Third Way leaves little space for unions. To be sure, their marginalization began under Kinnock and continued under Smith, but this became even more absolute under Blair when a Labour victory seemed imminent. As Ludlum writes, “the party’s original ‘basic and unifying purpose’…of advancing workers’ industrial interests has long been demoted, and frequently contradicted, as class politics became an obstacle to national electoral success.” (Ludlum 2001a: 128). While the 1980’s saw the expulsion of Militant from the party, by the mid 1990’s, even the influence of the Labour party itself on the government was weakened. Potential critical leftist/union entry points, at the party conference or with the NEC, were sealed. Both Blair and Brown were worried that Labour’s successes in the contemporary context would be limited by the party’s historic trade union affiliation. As King aptly observes, before the 1997 election, despite work on Blair’s credibility and Brown’s economic prudence, there was still the perception that the Labour party was “‘in the pockets of the trade unions’ ” and this was identified as one of the most significant reasons for not voting Labour (King, 1998:2004).
Consequently, in power, unions are not treated as “partners” or insider groups as they were in other Labour and even some Conservative administrations. The 1990’s provided a stark contrast to the institutionalized union-government cooperation of the 1970’s. Blair is opposed to unions having special voting rights and there is little consultation with them. In short, for New Labour, trade unions are relic of the “old Left” and so they become invisible in the party’s analysis of civil society (Yates 2002). Ludlum perceives:

In Blair’s Third Way pamphlet unions are missing, except in two references to the ‘old politics’ of the ‘Old Left’ with its defence of ‘producer interests’ and its ‘armies of unionized male labour’…The same absence characterizes Anthony Gidden’s Third Way, whose critique of 1980’s neo-liberalism does not even mention Thatcher’s assault on trade unionism (2001a: 116).

Given this exclusion, and as a result of their waning power, most key union leaders have acquiesced to Labour’s social and economic policies. “Many unions have expressed concern at New Labour’s ‘targeted’ welfare policy, but most accepted the pledge to stick to Conservative spending plans until 1999, welcoming subsequent increases for health and education” (Ludlum 2001a: 123).

The women’s movement has also had a tension-ridden relationship with Labour and its social investment state. While it may not be as “out” as it was under Thatcher, the women’s movement is still more on the outs than in. For New Labour, the women’s movement, as with trade unionism, is associated with “yesterday’s politics” (Coote 2000:3). What is worse, the women’s movement, anti-racist movements and other critical social movements invoke the fractious identity politics struggles of Old Labour of the 70’s and 80’s which lead Thatcher, the dailies and much of “middle England” to dismiss Labour as the “loony left” (Dobrowolsky 2002a). This is one image that New Labour was very keen to shatter.

Still, many feminists pinned their hopes on New Labour. Its discourses of modernization and inclusion held the promise of a potential break with the old boy politics of the past. In practice, the women’s movement has had its highs and lows with New Labour. Witnessing 101 Labour women elected, doubling women’s numerical representation, was definitely a highpoint. Conversely, observing the female social services minister, Harriet Harman, cut benefits to lone parents, most of whom were women, or having female speaker, Betty Boothroyd, disallow breastfeeding in the House of Commons, were certainly low points. Other disappointments followed in relation to both New Labour’s policies and the subsequent the drop in their numbers of women elected in 2001. In terms of policy, partisanship often trumped feminism for New Labour MP’s (ibid). Nonetheless it has been argued that numerical representation has made some substantive difference (Childs 2001). Indeed, feminists have welcomed the minimum wage and the new funds directed towards children and childcare. Still, they are not blinded to the limitations of the social investment state. Sylvia Bashevkin has roundly criticized its social and economic policies and pointed to their detrimental impact, particularly on single mothers (2002).
At the same time, however, given women’s historic association with children, there have also been efforts to use the discourse of the child strategically, on the part of women MP’s as well as women’s organizations. As Pippa Norris suggests, “the gender of politicians does not seem to matter on everything, but it does seem to matter most on gender-related values which have significant implications for sex equality policy in the labour force and home.” (2002:56). Thus, New Labour parliamentarians, including Harriet Harman, whom feminist activists like Anna Coote (formerly of IPPR) advised, put pressure on the government to formulate what was dubbed the “women and children budget,” (Thomson 2001:201; Coote interview). Harman and Margaret Beckett also steered through the policies that had the most impact for women- the national child care strategy and the minimum wage (ibid).

Actors in the women’s movement also mobilized. The Fawcett Society, a longstanding campaigning women’s organization, and its sister group, the Women’s Budget Group provide one illustration. Fawcett’s Director, Mary Ann Stephenson explained that women’s groups could criticize the child focus given that it sidelines issues like the feminization of poverty that give rise to child poverty. Alternatively, a more fruitful approach is to present these groups’ arguments in light of the child (Stephenson interview 2001). Fawcett and WBG also pressured the state and collaborated with it, to a certain extent, in an effort to influence specific policy proposals around the budget in relation to women. For example, these two organizations, CPAG, along with some women Labour MPs were opposed to the government’s original plan to have the WFTC paid through the pay packet. They “lobbied tirelessly” to direct the WFTC to the main carer, typically women, even if they were not in work (McLaughlin et al 2001:168).

Overall, as Ruth Lister, concludes, it would be “wrong to say that New Labour has ignored the issue of gender equality but the consensus is that it has accorded it relatively low priority” (2003:15). This is the case despite greater numbers of women parliamentarians, and the establishment of a Women’s, now Women and Equality, Unit, and other policies that may improve women’s lives.

Thus, the union and women’s movement provide two, prime examples of civil associations that are more out than in. But here are others who fall though the cracks. For example, people who cannot work, or who do not have children, asylum seekers and the list continues New Labour focuses on families, but only certain kinds of families it would seem. Nevertheless, because we contend that both advocates and critics have a role to play, as subjects, and signs, with their respective strategies and signification, civil society has had and does have an impact on the social investment state.

*Part IV: Political Alignments, Allies, Coalitions, Policies Matter: State/Civil Society Interactionism and the Social Investment State a Tentative Conclusion*

In the final analysis, it is clear that an appreciation of the nature and effects of state-civil society interactionism is crucial to coming to terms with the social investment state. In
Britain, given evolving political alignments, influential allies and numerous discursive, institutional and policy innovations, key civil society associations have been able to seize and shape opportunities.

Still, there are important caveats to keep in mind. Much depends on the types of actors and associations involved. Because New Labour is prioritizing consensual relationships over challenges and confrontation, this politics of consensus may work against more antagonistic actors (Dobrowolsky and Saint-Martin 2002).

Currently, national organizations speaking on behalf of children play an important role. These service providers and advocacy groups’ political mobilization is longstanding, but their influence has been episodic. At present, in Britain, their authority is significant given that children and youth figure so notably in the social investment state. Moreover, as social movement research suggests “challengers are likely to gain higher levels of access to- and concessions from- government when there is uncertainty within dominant political coalitions” (Imig 2001:8). This has also proven to be true in the British case. New Labour’s historic coalition partners, unions, and in the 80’s, social movements who supported Labour, are not so central to the social investment state project.

Nonetheless, even favoured relationships inevitably change. This is likely given the contradictory pulls between collaboration and openness, and centralization and collusion for the Blair government. Concerns have been raised about the fact that their partnerships are “adhoc and relatively impermanent in nature” (Tiesdell and Allmendinger 2001:920). What is more, there is a danger that the term might be “becoming discredited” that simply setting up growing numbers of partnerships is not “a recipe for success” and there needs to be “more rigorous thinking about the nature, form, and terms of inter-organisational collaboration” (Tiesdell and Allmendinger 2001:920).

In addition, the political opportunity structure undoubtedly changes over time and affects these relationships. As we have seen, it can extend from full exclusion through to substantive integration. However, not every association faces or perceives the same POS and that the POS may differ across different policy issues: “different associations may face a different POS around the same policy issues. A particular POS may discriminate against certain types of associations” (Maloney, Smith and Stoker 2000: 811). For instance, it would seem that in the run up to an election, civil society input has not been taken up as much as when New Labour was in office. During the 1997 campaign, there was not a lot of scope for interest groups, charities and social movements because Labour was careful not to be tainted by association and to bring up the loony left image of the past. Thus, groups like the Council of Churches of England came out with a report early in the campaign to “reassert the moral case for redistribution” as did the CPAG’s Britain Divided, but such groups initially had a “decreasing influence on a Labour Party anticipating power.” (Oppenheim 1998:149). And again, in the 2001 election, it was a tight crew of political advisors that drafted the election manifesto and the efforts of IPPR, the Fabian Society were not as explicitly apparent (Butler and Kavanagh 2002).
In the final analysis, governance structures are in the process of transition and change. New rhetoric, institutions and policies abound. Influential allies in government can exist especially when actors move in and out of positions in the state and civil society and back again. Not only formal structures, but also informal relations and the ensuing changed political context can and does affect relationships. It is precisely because of this kind of interactionism that the social investment state is not immutable, inevitable, or irreversible.

NOTES


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